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The need for improved domestic intelligence and information sharing to detect 
indications and warnings of terrorist acts and prevent them has raised concerns over 
privacy and civil liberties.  The relationship between national security and privacy and 
civil liberties is often modeled as a scale with security on one end and privacy and civil 
liberties on the other.  Success is said to be achieved when security and privacy are 
balanced.  This model forces one value to be traded for the other in a zero-sum game. 
A new model is needed, one that decreases the “cost” to Americans’ privacy and 
increases the “value” to national security.  Technological, policy and organizational 
innovation hold great promise in designing a new intelligence and information-sharing 
architecture capable of detecting indications and warnings of terrorism and, at the same 
time protecting the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.  The system must be 
designed with both ends of the continuum in mind. 
Using government documents that articulate desirable attributes for a terrorism 
early warning system and widely accepted privacy principles as requirements to design 
to, the thesis examines current or near-term technologies that could meet the challenges 
of both security and privacy.  Designing and building a system that supports both security 
and privacy will benefit both.  Ultimately, the thesis argues, this system will enable the 
Nation to fight terrorism effectively while upholding the liberties that form the core 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii




I. INTRODUCTION:  SOUNDING THE ALARM; RINGING THE BELL .................1 
A. MORE THAN CONNECTING DOTS ..............................................................3 
B. TECHNOLOGY AND THE ZERO-SUM FALLACY.....................................4 
C. THE NEED TO INNOVATE..............................................................................7 
D. METHODOLOGY: DEVELOPING A PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
MATRIX.........................................................................................................11 
II. MEETING THE NEEDS OF HOMELAND OPERATORS AND ANALYSTS.....13 
A. NATIONAL HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY ..................................15 
1. Intelligence and Warning.......................................................................16 
2. Domestic Counterterrorism ...................................................................18 
B. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL 
SUPPORT.......................................................................................................18 
1. Active, Layered Defense .........................................................................19 
2. Lead, Support, and Enable ....................................................................19 
3. Key Objectives.........................................................................................20 
4. Capabilities for Achieving Maximum Awareness of Threats .............20 
a. Core Capability: Capable and Agile Defense Intelligence 
Architecture.............................................................................20 
b. Core Capability: Collect, Analyze, and Understand 
Potential Threats. ....................................................................21 
c. Core Capability:  Detection, Identification, and Tracking 
of Emerging Threats in All Operational Domains ................23 
d. Core Capability:  Shared Situational Awareness within 
DoD and with Domestic and Foreign Partners .....................24 
C. INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT....24 
D. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY .................................................26 
1. Mission Objectives ..................................................................................27 
2. Enterprise Objectives .............................................................................28 
E. EXECUTIVE ORDERS ....................................................................................29 
1. Executive Order 13354 – The Establishment of the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) ...................................................30 
2. Executive Order 13355 – Strengthened Management of the 
Intelligence Community ....................................................................31 
3. Executive Order 13356 – Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism 
Information to Protect Americans ...................................................32 
F. SUMMARY.........................................................................................................33 
III. MEETING THE PRIVACY NEEDS OF AMERICANS .........................................35 
A. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS OF PRIVACY ...................................................36 
B. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE................36 
C. THE PRIMARY CONCERNS OF PRIVACY ADVOCATES .....................38 
 viii
1. The Chilling Effect..................................................................................38 
2. The Slippery Slope (Expansive Use)......................................................40 
3. Abuse and Misuse ...................................................................................41 
4. Mistaken Identity or Misidentification .................................................42 
D. FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES.............................................................44 
1. Notice/Awareness ....................................................................................45 
2. Choice/Consent........................................................................................45 
3. Access/Participation................................................................................46 
4. Security/Integrity ....................................................................................46 
5. Enforcement ............................................................................................47 
E. OECD PRIVACY GUIDELINES.....................................................................47 
1. Data Quality ............................................................................................47 
2. Purpose Specification..............................................................................47 
3. Use Limitation .........................................................................................47 
4. Collection Limitation..............................................................................47 
5. Security Safeguards ................................................................................48 
6. Openness ..................................................................................................48 
7. Individual Participation .........................................................................48 
8. Accountability .........................................................................................48 
F. PRIVACY MATRIX..........................................................................................48 
IV. TECHNOLOGIES THAT COULD ADDRESS BOTH SECURITY AND 
PRIVACY ...................................................................................................................51 
A. AN INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PROBLEM.....................................51 
B. AN INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SOLUTION....................................51 
C. TECHNOLOGIES THAT SERVE BOTH PRIVACY AND SECURITY...53 
1. General Attributes of Privacy and Security Enhancing 
Technologies .......................................................................................53 
a. Access Control.........................................................................53 
b. User Type Identification .........................................................53 
c. Audit Trails..............................................................................54 
d. Decentralized Information......................................................54 
e. Near Real-Time Operations....................................................54 
2. A Model of Technologies Acting with Synergy ....................................55 
3. Specific Technologies ..............................................................................56 
a. Access Control and Authentication........................................56 
b. Semantic Web Technologies...................................................60 
c. Anonymization and Pseudonymization..................................66 
V. POLICY AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATIONS............................................71 
A. INSTITUTING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTY OFFICERS .................71 
1. PCLO Training and Responsibilities ....................................................73 
2. Networked Leaders Creating an Information Sharing Network .......74 
B. INSTITUTING “ACTIVE, LAYERED OVERSIGHT”................................75 
1. Internal (Intra-Agency) Oversight ........................................................76 
2. Interagency Peer-to-Peer Oversight......................................................77 
3. Executive Branch Oversight ..................................................................78 
 ix
4. Congressional Oversight ........................................................................78 
C. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION...................................................................79 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................83 
































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi




Figure 1. The goal to simultaneously pursue increased Security and Privacy should 
guide the development of a terrorism early warning system. ............................9 
Figure 2. Factors that must be reduced, eliminated, raised or created in pursuing a 
system which simultaneously pursues both values of privacy and security. ...10 
Figure 3. A Privacy and Security Reference Matrix .......................................................11 
Figure 4. Desirable Security and Information Sharing attributes as articulated in 
various government documents. ......................................................................15 
Figure 5. Roles and Responsibilities of Homeland Intelligence and Information 
Analysis............................................................................................................16 
Figure 6. Commercial Satellite Imagery of New Orleans before and after Katrina.  
Image Courtesy DigitalGlobe ..........................................................................22 
Figure 7. The Left Hand or Security Side of the Privacy and Security Reference 
Matrix...............................................................................................................34 
Figure 8. Desirable privacy attributes that are widely accepted by privacy advocates 
form the Right Hand or Privacy side of the Privacy and Security Reference 
Matrix...............................................................................................................35 
Figure 9. A Privacy and Security Reference Matrix .......................................................49 
Figure 10. POLICY MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE: Client-Server Reference 
Model. ..............................................................................................................55 
Figure 11. POLICY MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE: Network Reference 
Model. ..............................................................................................................56 
Figure 12. Attributes that could be met or enabled by PKI and Smart Card 
technologies as a means for authentication and access control .......................60 
Figure 13. Attributes that could be met or enabled by the use of semantic web 
technologies .....................................................................................................66 
Figure 14. Attributes that could be met, enabled or deemed irrelevant by using 
anonymization/ pseudonymization technologies .............................................69 



































I am grateful to a number of organizations and individuals for their role in my 
ability to participate in this program and complete this thesis.  I stated in my application 
to the program that one of my primary motivations in applying was to form relationships 
and a network to respond to the challenges posed by terrorism.  I count my classmates as 
more than a network, I count them as friends.  Your communities are blessed to have you 
as their leaders and I am blessed to have you as part of my life. 
I would like to extend deepest thanks to the men and women of the NORAD 
Policy and Plans directorate whose encouragement during the last eighteen months has 
helped sustain me.  I would particularly like to thank Colonel Dave Blehm and 
Lieutenant Colonel Dan Fox for their support and for allowing me fourteen weeks in 
Monterey to “swim with the dolphins.” 
I am extremely grateful to the Center for Homeland Defense and Security staff 
and professors.  My experience in this program has been first rate despite the fact I was 
forced to do “real work” to earn this degree.  Special thanks should go to my thesis 
advisor Dr. Bob Bach and CAPT Simeral for their guidance and assistance in completing 
this project.  You have proven yourselves not only as excellent thinkers, but also as great 
servants to our Nation. 
Lastly, I want to express my deepest love and appreciation to my wife, Jodi, who 
deserves numerous medals for skipped date nights, below average number of ski days for 
two consecutive ski seasons and for not hurting me for typing when I should have been 
listening.  Your faith, hope and strength in battling brain cancer inspire me to bring those 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION:  SOUNDING THE ALARM; RINGING THE 
BELL 
On April 18, 1775, at about 11 O’clock in the evening, Paul Revere crossed the 
Charles River to begin his famous ride toward Lexington and Concord.1  In Boston 650 
to 900 British troops were preparing to cross the Charles River themselves to carry out 
General Thomas Gage’s order to destroy the American militia’s stores of weapons at 
Concord.  Revere’s “sounding the alarm” enabled the American militia to be prepared for 
the British attack.  When the British arrived at Concord North Bridge, the Americans 
were waiting for them and the “Shot Heard Round the World” touched off the American 
Revolution and eventually led America to liberty.2 
Revere and his fellow riders, William Dawes and Samuel Prescott, could be 
considered America’s first “early warning system.”  Early warning systems have changed 
throughout the years ranging from the low tech system of Revere and his fellow riders to 
a network of radars and satellites designed to warn us of a Soviet missile launch during 
the Cold War.  Yet, their importance has remained a constant.  National security demands 
that the United States not be surprised by an undetected attack.  Pearl Harbor and the 
September 11, 2001 attacks (9/11) reveal the necessity for an effective early warning 
system to “sound the alarm.” 
The day after Revere’s famous ride, a bell rang out in Philadelphia in honor of the 
battles being waged at Lexington and Concord.  This bell, since its installation in 1753, 
had been rung on numerous significant occasions.  It was rung when Benjamin Franklin 
traveled to England to discuss the America’s grievances against the British.  It was rung 
for the assembling of the first Continental Congress.  It was rung to call people together 




                                                 
1  The Paul Revere House, “The Real Story of Paul Revere’s Ride,” 
http://www.paulreverehouse.org/ride/real.shtml (accessed December 15, 2005) 
2  Worcester Polytechnic Institute Department of Military Science, 
http://www.wpi.edu/Academics/Depts/MilSci/BTSI/Lexcon (accessed December 15, 2005) 
2 
what would become America’s war for independence.  This cracked bell would later be 
dubbed the Liberty Bell.3  The ringing of bells came to mean both impending danger and 
celebration of freedom. 
The dual meaning of bell ringing is especially relevant today.  America suffered a 
surprise attack on 9/11.  The warning bells were silent.  A system capable of perceiving 
indications and warnings of terrorism was non-existent.  Four years later the government 
is still struggling to put together an early warning system that can detect indications of an 
impending terrorist attack and enable a response to prevent it.  In these efforts, the 
Government has also not been able to proclaim a celebration or protection of freedom and 
liberty.  Early initiatives to construct an early warning system have touched off deep 
concerns over potential infringement on privacy and civil liberties. 
Concerns over privacy and impacts to liberty have blocked several attempts to 
develop systems designed to provide indications and warning of terrorism.  A few 
examples include the Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA) program, Computer 
Assisted Passenger Prescreening (CAPPS II) and Terrorism Information and Preventive 
Systems (TIPS).  Privacy advocates such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
and the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) celebrate the de-funding and 
blockage of these programs as victories for privacy and critical to upholding liberty.  The 
only problem is that the victory has come at the expense of “early warning.”  As a result, 
government continues to declare its need for better surveillance and information sharing, 
and for the capability to engage in data mining. 
This thesis examines ways in which obtaining security and safety from terrorism 
may be achieved while maintaining essential liberty.  It was a critical question for our 
founding fathers, and remains so today.  Benjamin Franklin once challenged the Nation:  
“They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither 
liberty nor safety.”4  Must our counterterrorism activities today be overly intrusive to 
Americans’ privacy and way of life?  Must security come at the price of liberty?  Is it 
                                                 
3  Independence Hall Association, “The Liberty Bell,” http://www.ushistory.org/libertybell/ (accessed 
December 15, 2005). 
4  Benjamin Franklin, Historical Review of Pennsylvania, 1759, as quoted in Robert Bach, “Special 
Topics in Homeland Security” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, July 14, 2005).  
3 
even possible today to develop a strategy to “sound the alarm” to avoid being surprised 
by terrorism again while continuing to ring the bell of freedom? 
A. MORE THAN CONNECTING DOTS  
The 9/11 Commission Report showed that much of the information necessary to 
avert the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon was available, but the 
intelligence community (IC) and law enforcement failed to “connect the dots.” 
Additionally, certain “dots” were not available to the IC because of a prohibition on using 
certain collection methods within the borders of the United States.  Clearly, excellent 
intelligence is necessary to prevent another terrorist attack in the United States.  What is 
less clear is the policy that should govern domestic intelligence collection and the new 
imperative for vastly improved “information sharing” within the IC and agencies with 
responsibilities in homeland defense and security. 
An improved domestic intelligence capability and greater information sharing 
have many people legitimately concerned about the impact to privacy and civil liberties.  
The 9/11 Commission recognized the impact improved domestic intelligence and 
information sharing would likely have on privacy and civil liberties and pointed out  
government’s responsibility toward both security and civil liberty.  “Therefore, while 
protecting our homeland, Americans should be mindful of threats to vital personal and 
civil liberties.  This balancing act is no easy task, but we must constantly strive to keep it 
right.”5 
While the commission should be lauded for recognizing the importance of both 
values, the language they chose is problematic.  The problem with framing the debate 
with the metaphor of a scale with security on one end and privacy and civil liberties on 
the other is that it promotes the idea that one must come at the cost of the other.  Rather 
than view the problem as a balancing act between security and liberty, an effective policy 




                                                 
5  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. 
Hamilton eds, The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, D.C.: WW Norton & Co., 2004), 394. 
4 
the traditional portrayal of security and civil liberties as competing values that must be 
weighed on opposite ends of a balance, these values should be recognized as mutually 
reinforcing.”6 
This difference in language, while subtle, is more than just semantics.  Embracing 
the idea that security and privacy are complementary values rather than competitive can 
significantly reorient the thinking of the architects of a terrorism early warning system.    
Americans, their policymakers and innovators must recognize that both virtues are 
equally noble and vital to America’s continued freedom and prosperity.  They should 
demand that their terrorism early warning system cause both national security and 
privacy and civil liberties protection to increase, not be traded one for the other. 
The Gilmore Commission correctly observed, “The exercise of civil liberties and 
our way of life contributes to our strength and security.”7  Operating from this frame of 
mind, the United States can develop the innovations in policy, technology and 
organizational structures necessary to simultaneously advance the ability to collect and 
share information vital to prevent a terrorist attack and protect the constitutional and 
privacy rights of Americans. 
B. TECHNOLOGY AND THE ZERO-SUM FALLACY 
The balance metaphor is dangerous in the current national security context 
because it assumes that security and privacy are pitted against each other in a zero-sum 
game, assuming that an advance of one comes at the expense of the other.  The zero-sum 
equation fueled, in large part, the construct which came out of the Church Commission.  
In an attempt to curb abuse and tip the scales back toward privacy and civil liberties, 
domestic intelligence powers were severely limited. 
During the Cold War, since the enemy was largely overseas, this limitation did 
not significantly impact national security.  However, the threat of transnational terrorism, 
including terrorist cells inside the homeland, drives the need for improved domestic 
intelligence. 
                                                 
6  The Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess 
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, “Forging 
America’s New Normalcy:  Securing Our Homeland, Preserving Our Liberty,” December 15, 2003, E-1. 
7  Ibid, E-2. 
5 
In a zero-sum construct, an improvement in homeland security comes at the cost 
of privacy and liberty.  There must be a better metaphor and better way to achieve 
homeland security. 
An underlying assumption in the zero-sum fallacy is that the only tools available 
to protect the people from domestic intelligence abuse are laws and policy.  This view 
may have been true in the 1970s when most intelligence existed on paper and was stored 
in manila file folders in someone’s desk, but it is unnecessarily narrow in the information 
age.  There are many more tools that can be used to curb government abuse of 
information.  The use of policy and law is one means, technology is another.  The 
combination of technology and policy, or a policy enforced through technological means 
has the potential to change the calculus from a zero-sum game to an equation that allows 
gains to both security and privacy. 
It is significant to note that in its efforts to improve information sharing and 
develop a terrorism early warning system, the government is primarily pursuing 
electronic means.  Connecting counterterrorism agencies, analysts and operators and the 
information they hold electronically, in an online environment, carries implications that 
would not be present if they were connected via other means.  One important implication 
is that it allows software to be used as a means to regulate behavior. 
It has been said that in an online environment, “code is law.”8  Implementing 
software as a means to regulate and constrain the interaction and behavior of domestic 
and foreign intelligence analysts and operators could effectively turn “the wall” between 
the law enforcement and foreign intelligence domains into a “gate” which permits certain 
information to be shared while limiting that which is inappropriate.  An example of 
controlling behavior through software from the commercial world might clarify this 
point. 
Apple’s I-tunes software enables people on a network to share music files (digital 
information).  One simply has to check boxes that say “look for shared music” or “share 
                                                 
8  This phrase was popularized by Stanford Professor Lawrence Lessig’s book, Code and Other Laws 
of Cyberspace, which is currently being updated using a wiki to account for the numerous technological 
innovations that have occurred since its writing in 1999.  For information regarding the updated version 
see:  http://codebook.jot.com/WikiHome (accessed December 15, 2005) 
6 
my music” and he can either listen to a co-worker’s music or enable his co-workers to 
listen to his over a network connection.  Sharing music over a network is not contrary to 
anti-piracy laws.  What is contrary to anti-piracy laws is the “unauthorized copying” of 
music.  Rather than rely on law and a person’s moral character to prevent the 
“unauthorized copying” of shared music, I-tunes wrote the software to make it impossible 
to copy a music file that is being shared on a network. 
This “policy plus technology” construct for preventing the unauthorized copying 
of shared music has some interesting parallels that are relevant to sharing information for 
national security. 
First, the I-tunes construct enables “knowledge discovery” but at the same time 
limits the “discoverer’s” ability to abuse (by making an illegal copy) his access to the 
information.  For example, Jim may be a fan of country music and accustomed to only 
buying country music.  On his own accord he would likely not be interested in alternative 
music, let alone a band called “The Dead Milkmen.”  Suppose one day he is listening to 
his co-worker, Sue’s, shared music and “discovers” that he really likes a song called 
“Punk Rock Girl.”  In a moment of weakness he may attempt to disregard the law and 
illegally copy “Punk Rock Girl.”  To his dismay, I-tunes software thwarts any attempt to 
copy the song.  Finally, Jim decides that having “Punk Rock Girl” for himself is critical 
to his continued happiness, so he goes to the I-tunes store and pays the ninety-nine cents 
to purchase the song legally.  Apple declares victory because it has figured out a way to 
expand Jim’s musical interest, has thwarted illegal copying and has benefited from the 
revenue produced by Jim purchasing the newly discovered music. 
This example, while seemingly trivial in comparison to national security and 
Constitutional freedoms, shows how sharing information over a network can lead to 
increased knowledge discovery and at the same time limit the person making the 
discovery to a course of action consistent with policy.  The fictitious Jim could just as 
easily be a DoD intelligence analyst searching for information within a Terrorism 
Information Sharing Environment.  Technology could force the information to be shared 
in a way that preserves a USPERSON’s privacy (i.e. comply with Executive Order 12333 
and DoD 5240.1-R) and yet enable collaboration between foreign and domestic 
7 
intelligence analysts.  Their collaboration may enable the establishment of a terrorism 
nexus and open the door to legally investigate the USPERSON with increased scrutiny.  
This collaboration may not be possible in an information sharing environment that, in 
order to protect privacy, severely restricts the flow of information between domestic and 
foreign analysts. 
C. THE NEED TO INNOVATE 
The apparent clash between security and privacy is clearly a difficult problem 
requiring new and creative solutions.  Yet, that dilemma is an old, familiar one.  Plato 
said “necessity is the mother of invention.”9  Abraham Lincoln said, “The dogmas of the 
quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, 
and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act 
anew.”10  Both men understood that when an existing paradigm is inadequate to deal with 
a new problem, new paradigms must be invented. 
“Innovation” has become a buzzword in today’s business world out of necessity.  
Business leaders in the information age understand that they must continuously “think 
anew and act anew” in order to maintain their market share in an increasingly competitive 
and global business environment.  Innovation is critical to the survival of many 
businesses.  Innovation is also critically important to national security.  Connecting dots 
or moving from a “need to know” to a “need to share” culture is a challenging problem. 
Doing it in a way that protects personal privacy and individual liberties is an even greater 
challenge—one that invites solutions from leading thinkers in technology, policy and 
organizational theory. 
The national security climate the United States currently faces demands a full-
scale assault on paradigms that continue to treat security and privacy as a zero-sum game.   
 
 
                                                 
9  Plato, Republic, as quoted in The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, 3rd ed., ed. E.D. Hirsch, Jr., 
Joseph F. Kett, and James Trefil (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2002).  Accessed at 
http://www.bartleby.com/59/3/necessityist.html (accessed December 15, 2005).  
10  Brainy Quote, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/a/abrahamlin121071.html (accessed 
December 15, 2005). 
8 
Innovators from numerous disciplines must engage to change the calculus of both  
security and privacy.  Such innovation will require novel forms of cooperation between 
those tasked with defending and securing America from terrorism and ardent privacy 
advocates. 
The international best-selling business book Blue Ocean Strategy, suggests that 
the key to business growth lies not in competing for market share (in bloody “red 
oceans”), but by creating uncontested market space or “blue oceans.”  The authors of 
Blue Ocean Strategy found that what often separates winning companies apart is not a 
focus on beating the competition, but rather on creating a “leap in value” for the company 
and its customers.  This is what the authors call “value innovation.” 
Conventional logic suggests that a company can either offer increased value to the 
customer at a higher cost or offer a product of reasonable value at a lower cost.  Value 
innovation breaks this logic by offering a product that an industry has never offered 
before at a cost the customer believes to be reasonable.  Value innovation is “the region 
where a company’s actions favorably affect both its cost structure and its value 
proposition to buyers.”11  Value innovation does not focus on achieving an optimal 
balancing point between cost and value to undercut the competition, it focuses on 
creating a “never-offered-before,” more desirable product at an appealing price.  In doing 
so, it breaks away from the zero-sum constraint between cost and value imposed by 
industry competition. 
This idea from business can be borrowed and applied to creating a terrorism early 
warning system.  Rather than designing a system based solely on the design constraints 
intended to improve security and trying to use the system in a way that does not offend 
freedom, government should design a system that looks for opportunities where security 
and privacy attributes are complimentary rather than competitive.  “Value innovation” in 
this context would seek the development of a system which   simultaneously increases the 
ability for networked agencies to share information and solve intelligence problems 
(thereby improving the “value” of intelligence to the American people) and reducing the 
cost to privacy and civil liberties to a pre-determined, acceptable price.  Just as a “value 
                                                 
11  W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy (Boston:  Harvard Business School 
Press, 2005), 12-16. 
9 
innovation” in business attracts new customers and makes competition irrelevant, 
building a system that considers both security and privacy attributes in its design has the 
potential to win broad support from both those concerned about security and those 
concerned about privacy. 
Figure 1 graphically represents the intent to design a system which drives down 
the “cost” to privacy while increasing the “value” to national security.  This is not a 
balancing or competitive relationship.  It is a symbiotic, mutually reinforcing 
relationship.  The “value innovation” region is intended to depict the region where the 
impact to both privacy and security is favorable. 
In business, successfully defining this region likely means that both seller and 
buyer walk away pleased, each feeling as if they have gotten a good deal.  In the context 
of our problem, those tasked with protecting America from terrorists attacks and privacy 
advocates should both feel as if they are “getting a good deal.”  Ultimately, of course, this 
system is for the American people and its existence should make the American people 
more secure and free, not ask them to choose between values. 
 
Figure 1.   The goal to simultaneously pursue increased Security and Privacy should guide 
the development of a terrorism early warning system. 
(From: Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 16.) 
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The authors of Blue Ocean Strategy developed several analytical tools to help 
make the pursuit of blue oceans as actionable as competing within red oceans.  One of 
these analytical tools, the “four actions framework” lends itself particularly well to a 
discussion on the relationship between security and privacy. 
The four actions framework is intended to break the trade-off between market 
differentiation and low cost.  It can be readily adapted to our effort to break the trade-off 
between security and privacy.  In working to establish a blue ocean in business, the four 
actions framework asks four key questions: 
• Which factors the industry takes for granted should be eliminated? 
• Which factors should be reduced well below the industry’s standard? 
• Which factors should be raised well above the industry’s standard? 
• Which factors should be created that the industry has never offered?12 
Applying these questions to our problem involves looking at the current situation 
in which privacy and improved domestic intelligence and information sharing are viewed 
as competitors then asking which factors need to be eliminated, reduced, raised or 
created.  Figure 2 attempts to provide an answer to these questions and show how these 
answers might lead to the view that privacy and security can be mutually reinforcing 
rather than competitive. 
 
Figure 2.   Factors that must be reduced, eliminated, raised or created in pursuing a system 
which simultaneously pursues both values of privacy and security. 
(From: Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 29.) 
                                                 
12  Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 29. 
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D. METHODOLOGY: DEVELOPING A PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
MATRIX 
With the goal to develop a system which simultaneously increases the 
government’s ability to perceive indications and warnings of a terrorist attack and protect 
Americans’ privacy and civil liberties, it is important to discern and develop the attributes 
necessary to succeed at both.  These privacy and security attributes can then collectively 
form the requirements which can be used to design a system.  The effectiveness of the 
system can be measured against how well it meets both the privacy and security 
requirements. 
Using the best available literature for both privacy and security, a matrix can be 
developed to guide the design and development of the system.  Innovations can then be 
compared to the matrix to identify which attributes a particular innovation fulfills. 
Figure 3 shows attributes which have been pulled from the literature and serve as 
a roadmap for the remainder of the thesis.  The left hand side of the matrix is concerned 
with those attributes, as identified in various government documents, necessary to 
significantly improve information sharing and to perceive indications and warnings of 
terrorism.  The right hand side of the matrix is concerned with those attributes necessary 
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Figure 3.   A Privacy and Security Reference Matrix 
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This matrix forms the foundation from which the rest of the thesis will flow.  The 
next two chapters show the origins of these attributes and elucidate on their meaning.  
With these chapters as a backdrop, attention can then be turned to some current or near-





II. MEETING THE NEEDS OF HOMELAND OPERATORS AND 
ANALYSTS 
“In this war, we don’t have radar, we have intelligence.”  Department of 
Homeland Security Secretary, Michael Chertoff made this statement while defending the 
use of National Security Agency (NSA) assets to listen in on the telephone conversations 
of suspected terrorists.  “The total set of tools we have, whether it is the NSA monitoring 
programs, whether it is the Patriot Act, these tools are critical tools in defending this 
country against terror.”13 
Times used to be simpler.  During the Cold War, when the nation was worried 
about the Soviets flying “Bear” Bombers into our airspace or launching nuclear missiles, 
we had a system of radars and infrared satellites to alert us.  Imagery satellites captured 
large troop movements or the movement of military equipment.  There was little chance 
of a surprise strategic attack.  This early warning system, as it would have enabled a 
retaliatory strike that would devastate the Soviet Union, made the strategy of “mutually 
assured destruction” feasible. This strategy, though grim, guided us through the Cold 
War. 
Unfortunately, terrorist actions and planning are not as easily observed and 
discerned as the movement of missiles, submarines, tanks and military aircraft.  Terrorists 
use commercial communications, improvised explosive devices, the internet and 
commercial air travel.  The transactions which enable their heinous acts blend into a 
backdrop of the normal, everyday actions of an increasingly global society. 
Looking at the Cold War in the rear view mirror, defending against the symmetric 
threat posed by the Soviet Empire seems like an “easy” task compared to defending 
against the asymmetric threat posed by terrorists, but it would be a mistake to think that 
winning the Cold War was “easy.”  When the Cold War began, the missile warning 
satellite constellation, Defense Support Program (DSP), did not exist.  The first DSP 
                                                 
13  Greg Simmons, “Debate Rages Over Legality of NSA Wiretap Program,” Greg Simmons, Fox 
News, www.foxnews.com, (accessed December 21, 2005). 
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satellite was not launched until the early 1970s.14  When the Cold War began there were 
no imagery satellites.  The first photo reconnaissance satellite, Corona, was not launched 
until 1958.15  The early warning system we relied on to win the Cold War was not 
developed overnight.  It took a serious national effort, vast amounts of money and 
decades to develop.  To put it simply, America rose to meet the threat posed by the Soviet 
Union and the Cold War.  Meeting the threat required a guiding strategy, new 
technologies, new organizations and new policies working in concert.  While the Cold 
War strategy remained fairly constant, technology, policy, and organizations, evolved 
with the changing landscape and in response to the enemy’s actions. 
This fact should serve as an encouragement in our present struggle.  The United 
States does not yet have all the tools it needs to effectively meet the threat posed by 
transnational terrorists, but the nation is making progress.  The process of identifying the 
capabilities needed to build a terrorism early warning system and thereby prevent 
terrorism is well underway.  Many of these capabilities have been documented in 
numerous strategies, executive orders, laws and reports. 
This chapter will capture those needs as articulated in the National Homeland 
Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), the National 
Intelligence Strategy and Executive Orders relevant to building a terrorism early warning 
system and improving information sharing.  Figure 4 shows the security attributes 
derived from each of the documents.  The descriptions of each document that follows 
serve to provide context and expound on the attributes culled from each document. 
                                                 
14  United States Air Force, “Defense Support Program Fact Sheet,” 
http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=96 (accessed December 22, 2005). 
15  National Reconnaissance Office, “Corona Fact Sheet,” http://www.nro.gov/corona/facts.html  
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Figure 4.   Desirable Security and Information Sharing attributes as articulated in various 
government documents.  
 
A. NATIONAL HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY 
The National Homeland Security Strategy, published in July 2002 prior to the 
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, identifies six critical mission 
areas for Homeland Security.  The first three mission areas focus on the prevention of 
terrorist attacks:  Intelligence and Warning, Border and Transportation Security and 
Domestic Counterterrorism.  In addition to the critical mission areas, the strategy 
identifies four “Foundations of Homeland Security” which “cut across all of the mission 
areas, across all levels of government, and across all sectors of our society.”16  These four 
foundations are: law, science and technology, information sharing and systems and 
international cooperation.  The mission areas of intelligence and warning and domestic 
counterterrorism and the four foundations taken together formulate a high level outline of 
what is needed to develop a terrorist early warning system. 
 
                                                 
16  Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C., 2002). 
16 
1. Intelligence and Warning 
The mission area of intelligence and warning is focused on eliminating the 
terrorists’ ability to launch a surprise attack.  The strategy acknowledges the difficulty in 
determining the identity, location, capabilities and intent of terrorists since they often 
move freely within democratic societies.  The Intelligence and Warning section of the 
strategy specifically mentions the need to improve human source intelligence overseas 
(HUMINT), improve information sharing among agencies at all levels of government, to 
better utilize foreign-language documents and to identify, collect and analyze “new 
observables.” 
The linchpin in improving intelligence and warning is analysis.  The strategy 
breaks analysis down even further into tactical threat analysis, strategic analysis of the 
enemy, vulnerability assessment and threat-vulnerability integration or “mapping.”  The 
four types of analysis are intended to result in policy changes and capability 
development, preventive action and warning and protective action.  Figure 5 shows how 
the different types of analysis are intended to interact. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Roles and Responsibilities of Homeland Intelligence and Information Analysis 
(From: National Strategy for Homeland Security, 16.) 
 
Since analysis is identified as the linchpin, the major initiatives the strategy 
recommends the nation undertake are all related to analysis.  The first, enhancing the 
17 
analytical capabilities of the FBI, speaks to increasing the total number of analysts, 
improving those analysts skills and improving the information systems the analysts use.  
Additionally, it speaks of improving the relationship between the FBI and CIA.  The 
strategy speaks only of improving the analytic capability of the FBI, but it has become 
clear since its writing that the analytic capability of the entire intelligence community 
must be improved for counterterrorism. 
The second initiative, building capabilities through the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) division gave IAIP 
the burden of developing vulnerability assessments.  It also gave them the responsibility 
of mapping terrorist threats to infrastructure vulnerabilities.  Success in this area is 
dependent on IAIP being able to gather information from the entirety of the intelligence 
community as well as from state and local agencies and the private sector. 
A DHS reorganization in 2005 broke IAIP into an intelligence function, now 
called the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (IA) and a critical infrastructure protection 
function, now residing in the Directorate for Preparedness.  The fact remains that threat 
must be linked to vulnerability in an effective early warning system. 
The third initiative, implementing the Homeland Security Advisory System, is 
envisioned simply as a way to communicate indications and warnings of terrorism to the 
American people.  It is intended to be the output of the intelligence and warning system 
to the American people.  As with any security system, a properly functioning system 
should be in place prior to activating the alert mechanism, otherwise the alert mechanism 
is prone to go off without due cause.  This is akin to a car alarm going off for no 
particular reason—after numerous unspecified alerts, the alarm begins to be ignored. 
The fourth initiative, utilizing dual-use analysis, speaks to the ability for analysts 
to identify the equipment and material that might be linked to carrying out an attack and 
to be able to evaluate whether or not the purchase of such materials might be linked to a 
potential terrorist act. 
The final initiative, employing “red team” techniques, is simply another way to 
analyze the steps a terrorist would need to take prior to carrying out an attack and 
identifying vulnerabilities that might be subject to attack.  Use of these red teams could 
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be particularly useful in identifying the transactions which precede (buying certain goods 
or services, etc) carrying out an attack.  The knowledge gathered during red team 
exercises could aid pattern recognition to identify when these transactions are taking 
place. 
2. Domestic Counterterrorism 
The domestic counterterrorism chapter continues to emphasize the need for better 
information sharing among all levels of government.  It states, “The U.S. government has 
not yet developed a satisfactory system to analyze information in order to predict and 
assess the threat of a terrorist attack.”17  The need for the federal government to be able 
to use information owned by state and local governments and for state and local 
governments to be able to access federal databases is clearly identified. 
Major initiatives listed in the domestic counterterrorism chapter include:  
improving intergovernmental law enforcement coordination, facilitating the apprehension 
of potential terrorists, continuing ongoing investigations and prosecutions, restructuring 
the FBI to emphasize the prevention of terrorist attacks, targeting and attacking terrorist 
financing and tracking foreign terrorists and bringing them to justice. 
A common thread running through each of these initiatives is the necessity to 
access information wherever it resides.  Specific sources of information mentioned in this 
section of the strategy include the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 
database, the Department of State’s TIPOFF System which provides information on 
known and suspected terrorists and the use of commercially available databases (when 
used consistent with Constitutional standards).  The strategy also mentions the FBI’s 
creation of a consolidated watch list, fully accessible to the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities which would include information derived from the intelligence 
community, Department of Defense, foreign governments and the FBI.  Again, the need 
to link law enforcement and foreign intelligence information is clearly identified. 
B. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL 
SUPPORT 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security addresses what is needed for law 
enforcement and DHS agencies, but it does not deal specifically with the capabilities that 
                                                 
17  National Strategy for Homeland Security, 25. 
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must be developed for the Department of Defense (DoD).  The June, 2005 National 
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support identifies the capabilities DoD must 
possess if it is to be effective in the fight against terrorism.  This strategy makes no false 
division between a “home game” and the “away game.”  It more accurately describes a 
war that knows no boundaries and states that the highest priority for DoD is “protecting 
the United States homeland from attack.”18 
1. Active, Layered Defense 
The cornerstone of the strategy is what the authors call an “active, layered 
defense:” 
This active, layered defense is global, seamlessly integrating US 
capabilities in the forward region of the world, the global commons of 
space and cyberspace, in the geographic approaches to US territory, and 
within the United States.  It is a defense in depth.  To be effective, it 
requires superior intelligence collection, fusion, and analysis, calculated 
deterrence of enemies, a layered system of mutually supporting defensive 
measures that are neither passive nor ad hoc, and the capability to mass 
and focus sufficient warfighting assets to defeat any attack.19 
2. Lead, Support, and Enable 
The strategy sets up a framework that acknowledges that there are things that 
DoD must take leadership in, things they must support civil authorities in doing, and 
things DoD can do to enable other domestic and international partners to improve their 
contribution to homeland defense and security.  In speaking of leading, the strategy 
focuses on carrying out military operations to “dissuade, deter, and defeat attacks upon 
the United States” including its people and critical infrastructure.  In speaking of 
supporting, the strategy focuses on those tasks in which DoD personnel or equipment is 
needed to help another government agency be more effective in preventing, protecting or 
recovering from an attack.  In speaking of enabling, the strategy focuses on ways 
technology and expertise can be shared across military and civilian boundaries. 
Whether DoD is leading, supporting or enabling, it is important to note that in 
defending the homeland, DoD never acts alone.  The strategy makes it clear that DoD 
                                                 
18 U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington D.C., 
June 2005), 1. 
19 Ibid., 1-2. 
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needs other agencies (federal, state, local, private, international) and that it believes the 
other agencies need DoD to effectively combat terrorism. 
3. Key Objectives 
Operating within the lead, support, enable framework, the strategy lists five key 
objectives in priority order: 
1. Achieve maximum awareness of potential threats. 
2. Deter, intercept and defeat threats at a safe distance. 
3. Achieve mission assurance. 
4. Support civil authorities in minimizing the damage and recovering from 
domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive 
(CBRNE) mass casualty attacks. 
5. Improve national and international capabilities for homeland defense and 
homeland security. 
The primary objective in homeland defense lies in “achieving maximum 
awareness” of an enemy that knows no borders or boundaries.  If terrorists can plan and 
launch an attack from anywhere in the world, including within the United States, it is 
reasonable to assume that any system designed to perceive indications and warnings of 
that attack must be able to operate anywhere in the world, including within the United 
States, in order to be effective.  A system and military only capable of achieving 
awareness of threats originating outside of its borders is insufficient.  It must have the 
capability to look within the borders if that is where the threat originates. 
4. Capabilities for Achieving Maximum Awareness of Threats 
The strategy advocates for the development of numerous core capabilities in 
support of the objectives listed above.  The capabilities most relevant to “achieving 
maximum awareness” or developing a terrorism early warning system revolve around 
improving the nation’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability and 
improving information-sharing.  The core capabilities listed in this strategy are the 
capabilities DoD views as necessary to implement the National Security Strategy, the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Defense Strategy.  For a 
strategy document, the core capabilities listed are fairly specific. 
a. Core Capability: Capable and Agile Defense Intelligence 
Architecture. 
Protecting the United States from asymmetric threats require the 
intelligence community to adjust its focus.  The intelligence community had grown quite 
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adept at targeting and understanding the nature of Cold War threats.  The intelligence 
community must bring that same skill and professionalism to focus on the threat of 
terrorism. 
This adjustment is well underway as evidenced by the establishment of the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the establishment of DoD’s Joint Task Force 
for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT), the establishment of DHS’s Information Analysis 
and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate, the passage of the IRTPA and the 
issuance of numerous executive orders regarding intelligence reform and information 
sharing.  For its part in reorienting intelligence priorities, DoD will: 
• Focus on integrated collection management of foreign and military 
information and its application to homeland defense and homeland 
security; 
• Better utilize national intelligence capabilities to increase early warning 
and support prevention, interception, and disruption of potential threats 
overseas or in the approaches to the United States; 
• Collect homeland defense threat information from relevant private and 
public sector sources, consistent with US constitutional authorities and 
privacy law; 
• Identify capability needs for CBRNE sensors to meet homeland defense 
requirements; and 
• Develop automated tools to improve data fusion, analysis, and 
management, to track systematically large amounts of data, and to detect, 
fuse, and analyze aberrant patterns of activity, consistent with US privacy 
protections.20 
b. Core Capability: Collect, Analyze, and Understand Potential 
Threats. 
With regards to improving collections, the strategy focuses mostly on 
improving its overseas human intelligence capability.  It also states that the NSA and the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) “will continue to provide their unique 
capabilities in support of the national homeland security mission in accordance with 
applicable laws and regulations.”21  While not much more is said about use of signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) it should be pointed out that 
using these assets inside the homeland “in accordance with applicable laws and 
                                                 
20  Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 20-21. 
21  Ibid., 21. 
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regulations” is not a trivial matter.  However, Hurricane Katrina proved how technical 
intelligence assets can play a critical role inside the homeland and that it can be 
accomplished without major privacy implications.  For example, the NGA began 
providing imagery from both classified and commercial satellite systems in the aftermath 
of the hurricane to aid in the response and recovery effort.  In addition to satellite 
imagery, on September 1, the Air Force provided a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft to take 
pictures of the Katrina-ravaged gulf coast.22  The use of these assets inside the homeland 
during the disaster serves as powerful evidence that intelligence platforms typically 
reserved for overseas use will be demanded for use in the homeland when overwhelming 
political pressure is present as it was during Katrina. 
Figure 6 serves as a visual testimony to the utility of overhead 
reconnaissance.  In this case, the use of commercial satellite imagery of New Orleans 
before and after Katrina allowed a wide audience to grasp the devastation. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Commercial Satellite Imagery of New Orleans before and after Katrina.  Image 
Courtesy DigitalGlobe 
(From: David Leonard, “Military, Civilian Satellites Aid Katrina Relief.”) 
 
In addition to improved collection capabilities, the Strategy for Homeland 
Defense and Civil Support places emphasis on developing “a cadre of specialized 
terrorism intelligence analysts within the Defense intelligence community.”  An 
improved analysis capability is absolutely vital to achieving awareness of threats since 
                                                 
22  David Leonard, “Military, Civilian Satellites Aid Katrina Relief,” MSNBC, September 6, 2005, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9229100/ (accessed September 7, 2005). 
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unanalyzed collections are practically worthless.  DoD envisions their analysts imbedded 
at interagency centers, but states that their analytical capability is specifically intended to 
“support military activities overseas and in the approaches to the United States.”23  Given 
this exclusion inside our borders, it is essential that the information sharing processes be 
in place to allow rapid cooperation between DoD and interagency analysts covering 
domestic intelligence should a DoD response become necessary inside the homeland. 
c. Core Capability:  Detection, Identification, and Tracking of 
Emerging Threats in All Operational Domains 
Air and maritime domain awareness are a particularly challenging 
problem for homeland defense due to the high volume of traffic within these domains.  
The unimpeded flow of commercial shipping and air travel are critical to maintaining the 
economy.  As a result, the air and maritime domains represent an excellent opportunity 
for terrorists to hide among the masses, or blend in with normal, everyday air and sea 
traffic.  In addition, there are grave consequences associated with military action against 
a civilian target (for example the shootdown of a commercial airliner).  Simply put, the 
military cannot afford to make a mistake by misidentifying a friendly vessel or aircraft as 
hostile. 
As a result, it is not sufficient merely to detect, identify and track vessels 
and aircraft.  An effective surveillance capability would additionally allow military 
analysts and operators to discern the intent of a vessel or aircraft of interest.  This is a 
particularly challenging situation since a domestic persistent, wide-area surveillance 
capability with enough fidelity to determine intent is likely to raise privacy concerns.  
Without these capabilities, however, the military may be forced to take action with 
incomplete information perhaps resulting in the loss of innocent lives. 
Much work has been done since 9/11 to improve NORAD’s air 
surveillance capabilities by integrating Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) radar 
feeds, but the coverage is not sufficient against all potential threats at all altitudes.24  A 
similar problem exists in the maritime domain.  Developing a persistent, wide-area  
 
                                                 
23  Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 21. 
24  Author’s operational experience 
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surveillance capability within the borders and in the approaches to the United States 
“could require the development of advanced technology sensors to detect and track” 
aircraft and vessels of interest.25 
d. Core Capability:  Shared Situational Awareness within DoD and 
with Domestic and Foreign Partners 
“Shared situational awareness is defined as a common perception of the 
environment and its implications.”26  Based on the fact that the indicators preceding acts 
of terrorism quite often look like crime rather than building up for war, this strategy 
advocates for an “unprecedented degree of shared situational awareness among Federal 
agencies, with state, local, tribal, and private entities, and between the United States and 
its key foreign partners.”27  It goes on to lay out some specific capabilities necessary to 
achieve the goal of shared situational awareness: 
• Seamless connectivity and timely, accurate, and trusted information 
available to all DoD components 
• The ability to process information and move it to warfighters, 
policymakers, and support personnel on demand 
• Ability to establish a real-time link among sensors, decision makers, and 
warfighters to facilitate the rapid engagement of enemy targets 
These capabilities are dependent upon a worldwide, integrated information 
infrastructure with connectivity to wherever the pertinent information may reside.  DoD 
acknowledges the power inherent in such a vast, well-networked information system and 
identifies that its development “requires appropriate safeguards to ensure that DoD 
intelligence components rigorously apply laws that protect Americans’ civil liberties and 
privacy.”28 
C. INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) lays out 
succinct requirements for attributes that should be included in what it calls the 
“Information Sharing Environment” (ISE) in Title I Section 1016 of the law.  Prior to  
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listing those attributes, the law clarifies that the ISE is specifically intended for the use of 
sharing “terrorism information.”  The law provides a narrow definition for terrorism 
information. 
The term “terrorism information” means all information, whether 
collected, produced, or distributed by intelligence, military, law 
enforcement, military, homeland security or other activities relating to: 
a. the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, 
vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or activities of 
foreign or international terrorist groups or individuals, or of domestic 
groups or individuals involved in transnational terrorism; 
b. threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United States, 
United States persons, or United States interests, or to those of other 
nations; 
c. communications of or by such groups or individuals or 
d. groups or individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or 
associated with such groups or individuals.29 
The law tasks the President with the burden of creating the ISE “in a manner 
consistent with national security and with applicable legal standards relating to privacy 
and civil liberties.”  The law additionally tasks the President with designating “the 
organizational and management structures that will be used to operate and manage the 
ISE” and with the task to “determine and enforce the policies, directives, and rules that 
will govern the content and usage of the ISE.”30 
Having narrowed the ISE’s use to sharing terrorism information and established 
the President’s authority and obligation to establish it, the law moves on to specify 
certain attributes the ISE must contain.  Generally the law specifies that the ISE should 
ensure the ability to share “terrorism information among all appropriate Federal, State, 




                                                 
29  U.S. Congress, House, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (December 7, 
2004, 108th Cong, 2d sess,. House report No. 108-796). 
30  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 29. 
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technologies” and that it should be a “decentralized, distributed, and coordinated 
environment.”31  More specifically the law directs that the President should build an ISE 
that:  
a. connects existing systems, where appropriate, provides no single 
points of failure, and allows users to share information among agencies, 
between levels of government, and, as appropriate, with the private sector; 
b. ensures direct and continuous online electronic access to 
information; 
c.  facilitates the availability of information in a form and manner 
that facilitates its use in analysis, investigations and operations; 
d.  builds upon existing systems capabilities currently in use across 
the Government; 
e.  employs an information access management approach that 
controls access to data rather than just systems and networks, without 
sacrificing security; 
f.  facilitates the sharing of information at and across all levels of 
security; 
g.  provides directory services, or the functional equivalent, for 
locating people and information; 
h.  incorporates protections for individuals’ privacy and civil 
liberties; and 
i. incorporates strong mechanisms to enhance accountability and 
facilitate oversight, including audits, authentication, and access controls. 
Working from this guidance, the Director of National Intelligence, whose position 
was created by IRTPA and the ISE Program Manager have made substantial progress.  
One of the first fruits of their labor was the writing of the National Intelligence Strategy. 
D. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY 
The subtitle of the National Intelligence Strategy is telling—transformation 
through integration and innovation.  Transformation speaks of the need for change—not 
incremental change, but of a new way of doing things for a new era.  Integration speaks 
of the acknowledgement that intelligence organizations should not view themselves as 
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independent but interdependent.  It also speaks of the vision to merge foreign intelligence 
with domestic intelligence to thwart transnational terrorism.  Innovation speaks to the 
need for creativity in transforming and integrating the intelligence community. 
One thing that is clear from the beginning of the Intelligence Strategy to the end is 
that it intends to remove any barriers or “walls” to sharing information between foreign 
and domestic intelligence agencies or analysts.  It states very clearly, “the time has come 
for our domestic and foreign intelligence cultures to grow stronger by growing 
together.”32  The intentional destruction of the “wall” is noteworthy because it forces a 
hard look at why the wall between foreign and domestic intelligence was constructed in 
the first place.  The wall, conceived as a necessary protection of American’s privacy and 
liberty, must be replaced by something as effective (if not more so) as domestic and 
foreign intelligence grow together. 
Equally as noteworthy as the removal of the wall is the strategy’s stated 
commitment to preserving privacy and civil liberties.  As it states, “the emphasis placed 
on national intelligence reflects a change in the threats we face as a nation, not a change 
in our commitment to civil liberties and freedom.”33 
The overarching goal of the strategy is to integrate, through policy, doctrine and 
technology, the various elements of the intelligence community.  To accomplish this 
goal, the document offers fifteen strategic objectives in all, breaking them between 
mission objectives and enterprise objectives.  Some of these objectives, and their 
subsequent elucidation, give further insight into the type of tools required for a terrorism 
early warning system. 
1. Mission Objectives 
Three of the five mission objectives contain guidance that are highly relevant to 
building an early warning system for terrorism.  The first mission objective, “defeat 
terrorists at home and abroad by disarming their operational capabilities and seizing the 
initiative from them by promoting the growth of freedom and democracy,” identifies the 
need to: 
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• Integrate and invigorate all US intelligence efforts to identify and disrupt 
terrorist organizations abroad and within US borders 
• Uncover terrorist plans and intentions, especially those that may involve 
obtaining or using weapons of mass destruction 
• Enable those outside the Intelligence Community with valuable 
counterterrorism information (such as police, corrections officers, and 
border patrol officers) to contribute to the national counterterrorism effort. 
• Create an information sharing environment in which access to terrorism 
information is matched to the roles, responsibilities, and missions of all 
organizations engaged in countering terrorism, and is timely, accessible, 
and relevant to their needs.34 
The task of creating the ISE is laid upon the Program Manager, ISE, John 
Russack.  Additionally, this office is responsible for identifying the needs of federal, 
state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector and ensuring their needs are 
satisfied by the ISE. 
The fourth mission objective is focused on developing innovative ways to gain 
insight into the most difficult intelligence targets.  It offers two particularly relevant 
capabilities to this discussion.  The intelligence community needs the capability to break 
into the thinking of terrorist leaders by: 
• Making the best use of all-source intelligence, including from open 
sources, on the most difficult targets 
• Improving human intelligence and corresponding technical intelligence 
capabilities.35 
2. Enterprise Objectives 
There are ten enterprise objectives listed in the strategy, all of which contain 
important ideals for transforming the intelligence community.  There are two objectives 
which are particularly relevant within the scope of this thesis.  The first enterprise 
objective, “build an integrated intelligence capability to address threats to the homeland, 
consistent with US laws and the protection of privacy and civil liberties,” stresses the 
importance of uniting all of the players with the intelligence community.  It insists that all 
intelligence elements, in accordance with applicable laws and consistent with the 
protection of civil liberties and privacy, focus their capabilities to ensure that: 
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• All Intelligence Community components assist in facilitating the 
integration of collection and analysis against terrorists, weapons of mass 
destruction, and other threats to the homeland. 
• State, local, and tribal entities and the private sector are connected to our 
homeland security and intelligence efforts.36 
The fifth enterprise objective also contains guidance that identifies capabilities 
that homeland operators and analysts need in order to sufficiently protect the nation from 
terrorism.  This objective, “ensure that Intelligence Community members and customers 
can access the intelligence they need when they need it” is a reiteration of IRTPA’s 
direction to “ensure maximum availability of and access to intelligence information.”37  
To meet this objective, the intelligence community must: 
• Remove impediments to information sharing within the Community, and 
establish policies that reflect need-to-share (versus need-to-know) for all 
data, removing “ownership” by agency of intelligence information 
• Build a user-friendly system that allows customers to find needed 
intelligence and access it immediately 
• Develop flexible and secure networks adaptable to a rapidly changing 
environment and capable of getting intelligence in an unclassified form to 
non-traditional customers such as state, local, and tribal governments and 
the private sector 
• Create an intelligence “cyber community” where analysts, collectors, and 
customers can interact swiftly and easily in considering classified 
information. 
Taken together, the National Intelligence Strategy and IRTPA give the sense that 
the intelligence community is intent on transforming, integrating and innovating to meet 
the challenges of the twenty first century.  The pursuit of the above objectives shows that 
the DNI is intent on developing a comprehensive network of analysts and operators 
whether they wear suits, military uniforms, badges, or some type of protective gear.  This 
is significant because “it takes networks to fight networks.”38 
E. EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
President Bush signed three executive orders on August 27, 2004, each of them 
addressing some aspect of intelligence reform and information sharing. 
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1. Executive Order 13354 – The Establishment of the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 
EO 13354, sets policy for information sharing, establishes the NCTC as the 
primary “place” where the integration of counterterrorism information should happen, 
and defines the responsibilities of various players within the intelligence community in 
relation to the NCTC.  The policy, consistent with the documents above, states that: 
a.  To the maximum extent consistent with applicable law, agencies 
shall give the highest priority to (i) the detection, prevention, disruption, 
preemption, and mitigation of the effects of transnational terrorist 
activities against the territory, people, and interests of the United States of 
America, (ii) the interchange of terrorism information among agencies, 
(iii) the interchange of terrorism information between agencies and 
appropriate authorities of States and local governments, and (iv) the 
protection of the ability of agencies to acquire additional such information.  
b.  Agencies shall protect the freedom, information privacy, and other 
legal rights of Americans in the conduct of activities implementing section 
1(a) of this order.39 
The order establishes that the NCTC as the primary organization within the 
government for analyzing and integrating terrorism and counterterrorism information.  
The center is intended to support all other agencies tasked with counterterrorism 
missions.  The center was not established to execute operations, but rather to support, 
with the best available intelligence and planning, those organizations with operational 
responsibilities.  The center does have the authority to task agencies with specific 
counterterrorism operations though an agency who objects to their tasking may appeal to 
the National or Homeland Security Council. 
The order appointed the Director of Central Intelligence to supervise the center40, 
but the role has since passed to the DNI as a result of IRTPA.41  The order also directs 
heads of military, intelligence, homeland security, diplomatic and law enforcement 
agencies with terrorism information and responsibilities to make their information readily 
available to the center. 
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2. Executive Order 13355 – Strengthened Management of the 
Intelligence Community 
This executive order gives greater authority to the DCI, expands the role of 
national intelligence by amending EO 12333, gives the DCI greater control and oversight 
of the overall intelligence budget, gives the DCI greater authority in approving the heads 
of intelligence organizations and gives the DCI greater oversight in the development of 
minimum standards for the intelligence community.42  Most of the power and authority 
given to the DCI under this executive order were transferred to the DNI through the 
signing of IRTPA.43 
Some of the key amendments to EO 12333 related to the sharing of terrorism 
information include: 
…ensure that United States intelligence collection activities are integrated 
in: (i) collecting against enduring and emerging national security 
intelligence issues; (ii) maximizing the value to the national security; and 
(iii) ensuring that all collected data is available to the maximum extent 
practicable for integration, analysis, and dissemination to those who can 
act on, add value to, or otherwise apply it to mission needs. 
Establish common security and access standards for managing and 
handling intelligence systems, information, and products, with special 
emphasis on facilitating: 
the fullest and most prompt sharing of information practicable, 
assigning the highest priority to detecting, preventing, preempting, 
and disrupting terrorist threats against our homeland, our people, 
our allies, and our interests; and 
the establishment of interface standards for an interoperable 
information sharing enterprise that facilitates the automated 
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3. Executive Order 13356 – Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism 
Information to Protect Americans 
The third order President Bush signed on August 27, 2004, as the title suggests, 
deals directly with sharing information within the structure set up by the preceding two 
orders.  There is some repetition and overlap among the three orders, EO 13356 reiterates 
the policy put forth in EO 13354 and quoted above.  The order then specifically identifies 
the duties of the heads of agencies who collect terrorism information in ensuring the 
information is shared as widely as possible.  In addition, a requirement is given for the 
establishment of common information standards to improve the sharing of information 
across agencies such as: 
requiring, at the outset of the intelligence collection and analysis process, 
the creation of records and reporting, for both raw and processed 
information including, for example, metadata and content, in such a 
manner that sources and methods are protected so that the information can 
be distributed at lower classification levels, and by creating unclassified 
versions for distribution whenever possible; 
requiring records and reports related to terrorism information to be 
produced with multiple versions at an unclassified level and at varying 
levels of classification, for example on an electronic tearline basis, 
allowing varying degrees of access by other agencies and personnel 
commensurate with their particular security clearance levels and special 
access approvals; 
requiring terrorism information to be shared free of originator controls, 
including, for example, controls requiring the consent of the originating 
agency prior to the dissemination of the information outside any other 
agency to which it has been made available, to the maximum extent 
permitted by applicable law, Executive Orders, or Presidential guidance; 
minimizing the applicability of information compartmentalization systems 
to terrorism information, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable 
law, Executive Orders, and Presidential guidance; and 
ensuring the establishment of appropriate arrangements providing 
incentives for, and holding personnel accountable for, increased sharing of 
terrorism information, consistent with requirements of the Nation’s 
security.45 
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Finally, Section five of the order establishes an Information Systems Council 
(ISC) tasked with planning and overseeing the establishment of an information sharing 
environment to facilitate the automated sharing of terrorism information.  Contained 
within their task is the need to examine existing systems for gaps and overlap, 
recommend near-term solutions and to develop and environment that is scalable so that it 
can incorporate future sources of information.  In summary, EO 13356 establishes the 
need for the creation of common standards for information sharing, a recommendation 
for the establishment of clear procedures and guidelines regarding information sharing, 
and for the development of a plan to establish the ISE.  These tasks were given to the 
ISC.  At the present, the ISC has published their initial plan (20 December 2004) and is 
working in conjunction with the ISE Program Manager’s office. 
F. SUMMARY  
At the core of building an early warning system to deal with today’s threat of 
transnational terrorism is the ability to share information with any person or agency 
involved in the fight.  Today’s enemy is diffuse and networked.  As a result, the 
indicators of their intended attacks are diffuse and networked.  Perceiving these 
indicators requires a diffuse and networked system of people, information and technology 
centered on common objectives, policy and guidelines. 
The above documents give a roadmap of what the government envisions is 
necessary to make this network a reality.  These documents can be reduced to the 
following attributes forming the “left hand side” or security side of the matrix.  These 
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Figure 7.   The Left Hand or Security Side of the Privacy and Security Reference Matrix 
 
Very simply, the vision must be to create an environment where the right people 
can quickly and easily get the information they need, wherever it may reside, to carry out 
their mission to preempt acts of terrorism.  In doing so, as all of the guidance above 
affirms, the privacy and civil liberties of Americans must always be a key consideration. 
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III. MEETING THE PRIVACY NEEDS OF AMERICANS  
If the government is to generate an ISE or early warning system capable of 
putting “actionable intelligence” into the hands of those who need it to preempt a terrorist 
act, it must do more than just say it has the desire to protect the privacy and civil liberties 
of Americans while doing so.  It must articulate what is meant by privacy, convince the 
American public (or at least its representatives) that this definition is sound and show that 
the policy and technical control mechanisms governing the system can sufficiently 
guarantee this privacy can be maintained. 
This chapter identifies some of the privacy advocates’ key arguments and offers 
widely accepted privacy principles that should be considered in the development of an 
ISE architecture.  These principles formulate the right-hand side of the matrix and are 
















Figure 8.   Desirable privacy attributes that are widely accepted by privacy advocates form 
the Right Hand or Privacy side of the Privacy and Security Reference Matrix 
 
36 
A. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS OF PRIVACY 
Not all Americans share a common or even similar definition of privacy.   
Similarly, not all Americans value privacy equally.  At one end of the spectrum is Scott 
McNeely, CEO of Sun Microsystems, who infamously commented on privacy in the 
information age.  “You have no privacy, get over it.”46  At the other end of the spectrum 
are those who equate secrecy with privacy. 
The first notion of privacy (or lack thereof) in the context of government 
surveillance and increased information sharing is disconcerting and politically untenable.  
The latter notion likely faded with the advent of the computer, databases, the internet and 
e-commerce. 
Many Americans are apathetic toward the notion of the government being able to 
collect their personal information, making statements such as, “If I don’t do anything 
wrong, why should I care if the government reads my e-mail?”47  To others, the mere 
notion of improving the government’s ability to search across even its own databases or 
improve surveillance generates the fear that the government is developing Big Brother.48 
While it is outside the scope of this paper to develop an exact definition of 
privacy, it is assumed that most Americans concept of privacy lies somewhere between 
these two extremes.  Most Americans do not expect to live in absolute secrecy, nor do 
they expect nor desire their government to be able to intrude on the intimate details of 
their lives.49 
B. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
Early efforts to increase the government’s ability to mine and more effectively 
share data after 9/11, TIA and CAPPS II, were mired in controversy.  The controversy led 
to their ultimate demise via the loss of congressional support and funding.  A major 
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contributor to these programs’ demise is the absence of clear legal standards relating the 
use of new technology to the fourth amendment.50 
The United States v. Miller decision offers little help in this dilemma since it ruled 
that the fourth amendment does not apply to government acquisition of data in the hands 
of a third party since there is no “reasonable expectation of privacy” for information 
already released by the individual.51  The Miller case, decided in 1976, held that the 
government’s subpoena and subsequent use of Miller’s bank records to convict him of 
conspiracy did not constitute unlawful search and seizure.  In their ruling, the court 
commented that copies of the checks in question were “business records of the bank” not 
the “respondent’s private papers.”  Furthermore, the court stated that Miller could not 
expect those records to remain private since they contained information he “voluntarily 
conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of 
business.”52 
This precedent continues to hold despite the fact that personal information is 
much more readily available via the internet and through information brokers such as 
ChoicePoint or Lexis/Nexis than it was at the time of the United States v. Miller decision. 
The ubiquitous nature of personal and transactional information in 2006 combined 
with this Supreme Court ruling means government has access to large volumes of 
information unfettered by Constitutional law.  If a third party has a piece of information, 
there is virtually no Fourth Amendment limitation to keep the government from obtaining 
it.  Effectively, this makes it easier for a government agency to buy transactional 
information from information brokers than to gather it on its own. 
Normally, in the absence of Constitutional limits, Congress passes statutory 
limits.  To date, however, there is no clear statutory guidance for data mining and  
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information sharing activities.  This is especially problematic if the information available 
for purchase from information brokers is less accurate than information the government 
might be able to obtain on its own. 
The lack of clear legal guidelines intersecting modern information sharing and 
data mining capabilities impacts both privacy and security.  This lack of guidance 
undermines public confidence in the government’s ability to share and mine information 
in a way that does not threaten liberty. Additionally, it leads to uncertainty among those 
analysts and operators tasked with counterterrorism responsibilities.53  An analyst or 
operator uncertain as to whether or not he could “get in trouble” or jeopardize his 
credibility or career for a particular action is likely to avoid the risk. 
Thus, the letter of the law, as interpreted by court decisions, is of little use in 
lighting the way ahead.  However, the spirit of the fourth amendment, particularly the 
ideals of “reasonableness” and “probable cause,” is useful in the ongoing security and 
privacy debate.  Relying on these principles applied in a modern environment, Congress 
must rigorously engage in the debate and provide a statutory law to enable the 
government to make progress in preventing terrorism while addressing privacy concerns.  
Such a statutory law could further clarify the “rules of engagement” for the sharing of 
information and the design of a terrorism early warning system.  In the absence of such 
guidance, it is useful to examine the chief concerns of privacy advocates. 
C. THE PRIMARY CONCERNS OF PRIVACY ADVOCATES 
1. The Chilling Effect 
The chilling effect stems from the concern that people, if they feel they are being 
watched, will act differently or not engage in constitutionally protected activities out of a 
fear of being monitored.  This is not a new fear.  Vice President Hubert Humphrey 
articulated the impact of the chilling effect over forty years ago:  “we act differently if we 
feel we are being observed.  If we can never be sure whether or not we are being watched 
and listened to, all our actions will be altered and our very character will change.”54  The 
chilling effect could be a positive or negative depending on who changes their behavior 
                                                 
53  Cate, “Legal Standards for Data Mining,” 3. 
54  Hubert H. Humphrey, Foreword to Edward V. Long, The Intruders at viii (1967).  As quoted in 
“Safeguarding Privacy in the Fight Against Terrorism,” Report of the Technology and Privacy Advisory 
Committee (TAPAC) (Washington DC:  March 2004), 35. 
39 
as a result of feeling like they are being watched.  A terrorist, for example, might be 
deterred from a certain activity out of fear of detection.  However, an American may feel 
he cannot attend a religious service, associate with a certain person, or engage in political 
dissent out of a fear of observation or retribution as a result of that observation.  Since 
this has the potential to limit civil liberties, it is clearly a negative aspect of the chilling 
effect.55 
The chilling effect has not been particularly well supported by the courts.  For 
example, Laird v. Tatum, showed that, in order to be considered in conflict with liberty, 
actual harm and significant effect on constitutionally protected activities must be shown.  
In summary the court found that chill was not simply the result of the knowledge of being 
observed or “from the individual’s concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of those 
activities, the agency might in the future take some other and additional action 
detrimental to that individual.”56  Furthermore, the decision in Younger v. Harris showed 
that the mere presence of a chilling effect is not sufficient to deem a state action 
unconstitutional, especially if the state lacks an alternative means for controlling a 
particular conduct.57 
The chilling effect argument may carry less weight as society becomes more and 
more accustomed to being observed.  For example, some individuals appear to have 
grown quite comfortable with having private conversations in public places, sending e-
mails on computer systems emblazoned with “use of this system constitutes consent to  
monitoring” stickers and talking to spouses in the virtual “panopticon” of life inside 
cubicle farms.58  This is not to imply that the chilling effect should be dismissed, rather it 
is intended to place the argument in a modern context. 
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The TAPAC report suggests that “to diminish these risks [of the chilling effect], it 
is critical that government data mining activities be as transparent as possible and subject 
to both clearly defined limits and effective oversight.” 
2. The Slippery Slope (Expansive Use) 
The slippery slope derives from the fear that if new and greater power is given to 
the government to fight terrorism, it will eventually be used to address lesser crime.  The 
context of recent NSA wiretapping headlines is an illustrative example.  If wiretapping 
suspected overseas al Qaeda members’ phone calls to parties within the United States 
proves particularly effective, a fear is that it may spiral to tapping purely domestic 
telephone conversations.  Wiretapping may then be implemented to fight narcotics trade, 
then perhaps white collar crime and eventually petty crime.  Before long, wiretapping 
becomes the norm leading to what William Safire called the “supersnoop’s dream”59 and 
Michael Froomkin dubbed “perfect law enforcement.”60 
The slippery slope is a real danger when one considers the noble zeal most law 
enforcement, homeland defense and homeland security professionals bring to their jobs.  
These professionals are almost always driven to “do better” and the leaders of such 
organizations are normally more than willing to expand their power or reach as widely as 
possible in an effort to protect the populations they are responsible for. 
Unfortunately, history has shown a correlation between expanding power and the 
potential for corruption.  This presents the opportunity for what starts as a pure motive to 
serve the public the potential to turn into a threat to privacy and civil liberties.  To 
address the slippery slope, power must somehow be balanced and oversight mechanisms 
put in place to curb the slide from noble intentions to corruption. 
To guard against expansive use and the slippery slope, it is imperative that 
government clearly define the types of information that may be shared and not allow this 
definition to creep.  Fortunately, the authors of IRTPA provided a narrow definition of  
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“terrorism information.”  This definition is helpful as it defines that the use of the ISE is 
to be constrained to tackling the problem of transnational terrorism, not applied more 
broadly. 
3. Abuse and Misuse 
Many of the prohibitive policies that currently govern domestic surveillance, 
intelligence and information sharing practices trace their origins to recommendations 
made by the Church Committee Report which addressed the problem of intelligence 
abuse and misuse during the sixties and seventies.  These abuses are not make-believe 
stories that the privacy lobby invented.  An excerpt from the report succinctly 
summarized the problem. 
(The Church Committee) found control and accountability failures in 
oversight and supervision.  Those responsible for overseeing and 
supervising domestic intelligence activity delegated broad authority 
without establishing guidelines and procedural checks, failed to monitor 
activities, were at times willfully ignorant of improper or illegal activity, 
and even requested questionable practices. Internal agency oversight was 
inadequate.  Investigations were overbroad, operated without standards, 
and dragged out long after any national security objective had expired. 
Information was often collected and disseminated to serve the political 
interests of a particular intelligence agency or administration or to 
influence social policy and political decisions, and information on 
individuals was disseminated too freely and retained past any point of 
relevance for national security purposes.61 
Given this relatively recent history of government abuse, the public’s fear of 
abuse and misuse of personal information is one that must be confronted head on.  The 
policy and technologies put in place to enable oversight and guard against abuse must not 
only be effective they must be explainable to the public is such a way that results in 
increased trust.  As a goal, these mechanisms should strive to satisfy even the most 
aggressive privacy advocates.  In fact, they should likely be developed with the policy 
advocate’s input.  Quite simply, the protections against misuse and abuse must be 
overwhelmingly convincing or they will become mired in the political process and the 
system is likely to never see the light of day. 
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4. Mistaken Identity or Misidentification 
Mistaken identity or misidentification rises out of the fear that a negative action, 
might be taken against an innocent individual.  In a system designed to preempt or 
prevent terrorism (as opposed to waiting for the criminal act to occur) it is possible that 
innocents could be arrested, harmed or even killed.  Misidentification could manifest 
itself in myriad ways such as data errors, through the process of data integration, as the 
result of matching names only and through false positives.62 
Databases often contain incorrect or inaccurate information.  Pam Dixon of the 
World Privacy Forum conducted a study of the accuracy of one of the country’s leading 
information brokers, ChoicePoint.  In her sample, 90% of the records she obtained had 
errors.  Some of the errors were glaring such as the wrong sex.  Numerous anecdotes 
reflect individuals obtaining their ChoicePoint report and noting errors such as being 
identified as owners of businesses they did not own or having post office boxes they did 
not have.63 
Data errors can occur by transposing letters or numbers, by transposing first and 
last names, by mixing data fields (e.g. associating one person’s address with the wrong 
name) and many other ways.  Given that data can often be inaccurate, information should 
be corroborated through multiple sources when possible and negative action should be 
greatly constrained when there is uncertainty in the accuracy of the data.  As an example, 
the government should not detain a person based solely on data obtained from a third 
party data broker such as ChoicePoint or Lexis/Nexis. 
Integrating vast volumes of data carries with it the difficulty of ensuring that data 
is attributed to the correct individual and only that individual.  The TAPAC report 
highlights many of these challenges. 
One challenge is that names are often spelled and stored in various ways.  For 
example the author may be referred to as Kneilan Novak, Kneil Novak, Kneilan K.  
 
 
                                                 
62  TAPAC Report, 37-38. 
63  Electronic Privacy Information Center, “ChoicePoint,” www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint 
(accessed February 22, 2006). 
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Novak, K. Novak, or perhaps by a misspelling such as Neil Novak or Neil Knovak.  
Ensuring that personal information is matched to each potential rendering of a name is a 
challenge. 
Another challenge is name changes.  There are 2.3 million marriages and 1.1 
million divorces annually, most of which result in name changes.64  Databases must keep 
up with these name changes and ensure that all pertinent data fields are transferred from 
one name to the next. 
An additional challenge is that many people share names.  There are tens of 
thousands of John Smiths in the United States.  Keeping straight which information goes 
with which John Smith is a difficulty.65  Many individuals have multiple addresses and/or 
post office boxes.  Additionally, according to the US Postal Service, seventeen percent of 
Americans (43 million people) change addresses every year.  Keeping up with which 
address goes with which person poses a great challenge. 
Finally, organizations record personal information in numerous different ways, in 
numerous different formats and on numerous different computer systems.  The problem 
of information integration is difficult in the English language.  The problem is 
exacerbated by the inclusion of foreign names and multiple aliases.  This poses a great 
challenge to keeping accurate and up-to-date watchlists. 
Cases of mistaken identity using watch lists based on name only matching has 
been documented in the press.  A 2003 USA Today article highlights the travel difficulties 
encountered by individuals such as Greg Yasinitski and David Nelson who have the 
misfortune of having the same names as suspected terrorists.66  Fortunately, these cases 
only involve traveling hassles, not something more serious like false imprisonment or 
loss of life.  Nevertheless, an effective terrorism early warning system must minimize 
cases of mistaken identity. 
                                                 
64  National Center for Health Statistics, NationalVital Statistics Reports 51, no. 8 (May 19, 2003): 1, 
table a. As quoted in TAPAC Report, 37. 
65  TAPAC Report, 37. 
66  Editorial, “Glitches Repeatedly Delay Innocent Air Travelers,” USA Today, June 25, 2003.  
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False positives, or identifying innocent people as potential terrorists when they are 
not, as a result of pattern matching in data algorithms is certain to occur.67  In fact, the 
more sensitive an algorithm or process is, the more likely it is to generate false positives.  
Highly sensitive tests in medicine such as PSA tests for prostate cancer and pap smears 
for cervical cancer have high false positive rates.  This has the benefit of low false 
negative rates (missing the cancer that is in fact present).68  An early warning system 
reliant on pattern recognition or data-mining must compensate for false positives and 
establish clear guidelines for correcting the data or process that led to the erroneous alert. 
To address the concerns highlighted above and establish privacy attributes that 
could be incorporated into a terrorism early warning system, it may be useful to consider 
two existing frameworks.  The concepts underlying the Privacy Act have come to be 
known as “The Fair Information Practices” and are helpful in outlining a framework for 
privacy. 
Another existing framework is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) Privacy Guidelines.  These two frameworks can be used to guide 
the development of privacy features necessary in future information sharing, data-mining 
and surveillance technologies. 
D. FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES 
A proposal to establish a government centralized repository of information on US 
citizens in 1965 invigorated debate that led to the passage of the Privacy Act of 1974. 
The principles known as “fair information practices” were first presented in a 1973 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare report.69  The Privacy Act emerged out of 
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protect privacy.  In fact, in recent times the Federal Trade Commission has sought to 
apply the fair information practices to internet commerce as a way to protect the privacy 
of consumers.70 
1. Notice/Awareness 
Notice or awareness refers to the necessity for data collectors to make users aware 
of the fact that they are collecting information and make them aware of their information 
practices.  This includes what information they collect, how they collect it, how they use 
the information, whether or not they provide it to other parties, and how they provide for 
the other fair information practice principles in the handling of personal information.  A 
modern representation of the notice principle is the ubiquitous use of a “privacy policy” 
link on web sites.  Clicking on this link gives notice to the web site user of the site’s 
policies regarding use of personal information. 
Notice may be a difficult principle to apply in a national security context since it 
is generally disadvantageous to let an enemy know that you are collecting intelligence on 
them.  However, in a domestic context it is important for the government and the 
governed to understand what information needs to be collected, the purpose for which it 
is being collected, why it is effective in fighting terrorism and any potential risk the 
collection poses to society.  The principle of notice need not be applied to the collection 
of foreign intelligence, but domestic collections should be rigorously debated with full 
disclosure of how the information is used.  Temptations to develop secret domestic 
intelligence gathering mechanisms should be avoided since their eventual disclosure 
(through a leak to the press of some other means) would likely cause a setback for both 
security and privacy. 
2. Choice/Consent 
Choice refers to the ability of the person whose information is being gathered to 
have a say in how their personal information is used.  On the internet this is often seen in 
the form of check boxes at the bottom of a form requiring personal information.  The 
check boxes may ask whether or not a person wants to be added to a mailing list, receive 
                                                 
70  “Privacy Online:  Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace,” Report to Congress, 
FTC May 2000. 
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e-mails regarding certain products or services or have their information released to a third 
party.  These opt-in or opt-out constructs are common ways to provide for choice. 
The idea of consent is not constrained to the internet.  Consent operates in the law 
enforcement domain every day.  A law enforcement official may legally search personal 
property (such as the trunk of a car) if consent is given.  However, in the absence of 
consent an officer must establish probable cause to pursue a warrant to conduct the 
search.  Miranda rights offer suspects certain choices such as “the right to remain silent.”  
Sometimes suspects choose to waive this right and incriminate themselves, but it is 
important that they be given the choice. 
Choice may, at first, seem to limit the government’s ability to extract terrorist 
information.  It may seem improbable that information concerning a terrorist act would 
be willfully surrendered, but it is certainly not unheard of for criminals to choose to 
confess to a crime or turn themselves in.  The legal system allows for confession, but 
provides the avenue for the suspect to remain silent and force the burden of proof onto 
the government’s evidence.  A terrorism early warning system, since terrorism often 
presents itself as crime, should provide for a similar mechanism. 
3. Access/Participation 
Access from a consumer perspective means that a person should be able to view 
his own personal information held in a database and contest its accuracy.  An example is 
the ability to request one’s own credit report and address inaccuracies contained in the 
report with credit reporting agencies such as EquiFax, Experian or TransUnion.  The Fair 
Credit and Reporting Act requires that adverse action (denial of credit or refusal to hire 
based on information in a credit report) be reported to the individual.71 
4. Security/Integrity 
Data collectors must take steps to ensure that the personal information they collect 
remains secure from unauthorized use.  In the context of an ISE this should not only 
include security from outside threats such as hackers and identity thieves trying to gain 
access to personal information contained in the ISE, but also from insiders who have 
access to the system.  In the national security environment, data security is also known as 
“Information Assurance.” 
                                                 
71  Solove and Hoofnagle, “A Model Regime of Privacy Protection (Version 1.1).” 
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5. Enforcement 
Enforcement refers to the capability for government or self-regulating bodies to 
impose penalties or sanctions on those who fail to abide by fair information practices.  In 
the information sharing and terrorist early warning context it is critical that privacy policy 
be enforceable.  This enforcement should be a primary motive in developing the 
architecture and technologies that are part of the ISE.  Technologies that could enable 
enforcement will be discussed later. 
E. OECD PRIVACY GUIDELINES 
OECD member countries recognized early on the need to protect the privacy of 
personal information in transborder trade.  They understood that a country that failed to 
adequately protect information privacy could face trade sanctions.  The member nations 
developed privacy guidelines to protect privacy, but they also developed them to avoid 
potentially more restrictive definitions of privacy that might restrict the flow of 
information required for trade.  These principles are generally well accepted amongst 
privacy advocates worldwide. 
1. Data Quality 
Data quality simply refers to the need for data to be up-to-date and accurate.  
Additionally, the data should be relevant to the purpose for which it is to be used. 
2. Purpose Specification 
Purpose specification dictates that the purpose for which the data is collected 
should be articulated no later than the time of collection.  Subsequent uses of the data 
should be compatible with the original specified purpose.  If the data is to be used for 
another purpose, the additional purpose should be specified. 
3. Use Limitation 
The use limitation principle states that personal data should not be disclosed or 
made available for purposes other than those specified unless authorized by the data 
subject or by the authority of law. 
4. Collection Limitation 
The collection limitation principle states that personal information should be 
obtained via lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or 
consent of the data subject. 
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5. Security Safeguards 
The security safeguards principle requires that personal data should be reasonable 
protected against loss, unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of 
the data. 
6. Openness 
The openness principle states that “there should be a general policy of openness 
about developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data.  Means should 
be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and the 
main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the data 
controller.”72 
7. Individual Participation 
This principle espouses the belief that individuals should have the right to know 
what information a data holder possesses related to him.  The individual should be able to 
gain access to what information a data holder has within a reasonable time, at a charge 
that is not excessive, in a reasonable manner and in a form that is intelligible to him.  
Additionally, the person should be given a reason if a request for information is denied 
and should have opportunity to challenge the denial.  If the individual discovers that the 
data holder has inaccurate data, he should be able to challenge and have the information 
erased, rectified, completed or amended as necessary. 
8. Accountability 
Accountability is similar to the fair information practice of enforcement.  Data 
holders should be held accountable to abide by the principles and implement measures or 
technology to ensure the ability to comply. 
F. PRIVACY MATRIX 
Using the fair information practices and the OECD guidelines as guiding 
principles for privacy, it is possible to represent them in a matrix.  This “right hand side” 
of the matrix articulates the privacy requirements that should be considered when 
developing the architecture and technologies necessary in a terrorism early warning  
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system.  These principles, since they are widely accepted by privacy advocates in the 
United States and international community, provide an aiming point that would likely 
gain bipartisan consensus in Congress. 
Adding the “right hand side” of the matrix to the “left hand side” results in a 
matrix than can be used to guide the development of an architecture which considers both 
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Figure 9.   A Privacy and Security Reference Matrix 
 
Having described the attributes the government says it must have to detect 
indications and warnings of terrorism and discussed principles which could help ensure 
Americans’ privacy is maintained within the system, attention can be turned to 
































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
51 
IV. TECHNOLOGIES THAT COULD ADDRESS BOTH 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
With the matrix developed, it is possible to investigate some existing or near-term 
technologies that might be able to meet some of the requirements from one or both sides 
of the matrix.  This chapter, while not an exhaustive listing of technologies that could be 
used, shows how technological innovation could facilitate an architecture designed to 
meet security needs, provide for Americans’ privacy and protect against a too-powerful 
government. 
A. AN INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PROBLEM 
In many cases, counterterrorism analysts and operators do not want more 
information as it could lead to information overload.  Rather, they want the right 
information with enough accuracy and fidelity to do something with it.  Stated another 
way, having unfettered access to all Americans’ information is not desired.  Having 
access to relevant, actionable terrorism information is the desire. 
A primary concern for privacy advocates is innocent people being judged falsely 
or out of context or having constitutionally protected activities scrutinized.  Essentially 
they are concerned about government having the right information too, as articulated in 
the previous chapter.  In this regard, security and privacy share a common goal:  get the 
right information (indications and warnings of terrorism) and filter out all irrelevant or 
unnecessary information.  This requires an unprecedented capability to carefully manage 
information. 
B. AN INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SOLUTION 
Fortunately, the ability to manage information has exploded over the last several 
decades.  Even in the last year, innovations such as Really Simple Syndication (RSS) and 
Podcasting have proliferated on the internet.  RSS has even been introduced on classified 
intranets such as Intelink. 
Yet, the policy which governs the way intelligence and information sharing are 
conducted in the United States has largely failed to take advantage of the information 
revolution.  The policies have not taken advantage of technology’s vast capabilities to 
better manage information and, as a result, curb the abuse of information. 
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It seems government has made ample use of technology as a means to collect 
more information, but has chosen to rely solely on policy as a means to control 
information regarding US citizens.  Perhaps this is due to the fact that during the Cold 
War the only threats perceived to be capable of destroying the nation were outside of our 
borders, therefore the need to collect information inside the borders was so infrequent 
that law and policy alone could sufficiently handle the problem.  Now that it has been 
shown that a strategic attack against the country can originate from inside our borders, a 
greater need to be able to conduct domestic intelligence activities may force an 
information management solution—one that is guided by clear policy and enforced 
through code or technical means. 
It is ironic that the initial investment and development work that resulted in the 
Internet was a government initiative at Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA).  The irony lies in the fact that the internet has revolutionized the way 
information is shared and managed and yet one of the significant government failures to 
prevent 9/11 was an inability to share information across the government or “connect the 
dots.”73 
This failure led to reform in the Intelligence Community,74 the work of the 
Markle Foundation and significant investigation of what would constitute a Trusted 
Information Network,75 the delivery of several Executive Orders dealing with 
information sharing76 and new legislation governing how the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities should interact.  Despite these efforts, there is still not a great 
deal of national consensus on how to go about responding to terrorism while maintaining 
privacy and fundamental liberties.  There is still great division among government 
agencies trying to combat terrorism and privacy advocates who wield great power in 
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influencing congressional support of tools intended to aid the “war on terrorism.”77  For 
this reason, the technology government develops to further improve information sharing 
must dually serve security and enhance privacy protections in a real way. 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on near-term technologies that can impact 
security and privacy.  Each technology discussed will reference the Privacy and Security 
Reference Matrix developed in the previous chapters, highlighting the attributes from 
either side of the matrix the particular technology may be able to accommodate. 
C. TECHNOLOGIES THAT SERVE BOTH PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
1. General Attributes of Privacy and Security Enhancing Technologies 
There are several general attributes a network must possess in order to accomplish 
the goal of simultaneously enhancing information sharing and protecting the privacy and 
Constitutionally-protected rights of Americans. 
a. Access Control 
The network must ensure that only people with counterterrorism, 
homeland defense and homeland security responsibilities can access the information 
contained within the network.  The network must be secure and require some form of 
authentication to access it. 
b. User Type Identification 
The network must further be able to differentiate between different types 
of users in order to determine what users are allowed to see what data.  For example, 
under current guidance established in EO 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R it would be 
inappropriate for an intelligence analyst at NORTHCOM to have access to the name, 
social security number, address and phone number of a USPERSON unless a terrorism 
nexus has already been established.78  A military analyst may, however, benefit from 
being able to see anonymized transactions the USPERSON is engaged in and be able to 
add a puzzle piece from foreign intelligence that may disrupt a terrorist plot before it 
reaches the execution phase.  User type identification would recognize the user as a 
military analyst and provide only de-identified data (data that does not allow the analyst 
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to determine the identity of the subject yet provide all information regarding the person’s 
suspicious activity allowing the military analyst to look for terrorism ties).  The point of 
user type identification is to control what information a particular user may access and 
what he may do with the information once he has accessed it (save a copy, print, share 
with another agency, etc.)  This provides users access at the data level rather than the 
system level—an attribute called for in IRTPA and reflected in the matrix. 
c. Audit Trails 
Another attribute of an information sharing network should be the 
capability to produce immutable and non-repudiable audit trails.  In other words, the 
network should keep track of the information that users access and what they do with the 
information.  These audit trails would be key to effective oversight and accountability.  
Policy must clearly dictate who reviews the audit trails and what action should be taken if 
they reveal impropriety. 
d. Decentralized Information 
The information available within the network should not be stored in a 
central database nor controlled by a central information broker.  The network should pull 
from existing (legacy) databases that various organizations already possess and enable 
individual analysts to search for the information they need across the multiple data 
repositories (assuming they have the right credentials to access the information).  If 
information is power, decentralizing the information effectively decentralizes power.  
This may serve to alleviate some of the fear associated with one organization gaining too 
much power. 
e. Near Real-Time Operations 
The network must have sufficient capacity and data rates to support 
dissemination, collaboration and communication among users in near real-time.79  Some 
information may be deemed only suitable to be shared during an ongoing terrorism 
operation (e.g. information that could be used to mount a military response to an attack in 
progress).  This could serve privacy by allowing certain sensitive data only to be sent to 
certain agencies as needed.  Additionally, access to certain information could be 
unavailable in an archived format or be set with accesses that expire after a certain period 
                                                 
79  Second Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. 
55 
of time.  This would preclude certain users’ ability to archive or analyze this data, yet 
provide a means for the government to respond if necessary. 
2. A Model of Technologies Acting with Synergy 
Many of these attributes are captured in a model known as the “Policy Appliance 
Reference Model developed by Mr. K. A. Taipale from the Center for Advanced Studies 
in Science and Technology Policy.  Mr. Taipale’s model offers a nice skeleton to narrow 
an investigation of the types of technologies that might prove useful in an information 
sharing network which protects the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.  The two 
figures below describe the model.80 
 
Figure 10.   POLICY MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE: Client-Server Reference Model. 
An enterprise architecture reference model for knowledge management (an information 
product approach) that includes policy appliances (technical control mechanisms to 
enforce policy rules and ensure accountability) interacting with smart data (data that 
carries with it contextual relevant terms for its own use) and intelligent agents (queries 
that are self-credentialed, authenticating, or contextually adaptive). 
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Figure 11.   POLICY MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE: Network Reference Model. 
An enterprise architecture reference model showing policy appliances (technical control 
mechanisms to enforce policy rules) and logging functions (to record and audit for 
accountability) in network stack relationship. 
 
With these attributes and models as a frame of reference, it is possible to propose 
some specific existing or emerging technologies that could be used and how they might 
serve both the privacy of citizens and the needs of those tasked with keeping the nation 
secure. 
3. Specific Technologies 
a. Access Control and Authentication 
The Defense Department’s (DoD) Common Access Card (CAC) serves as 
the new identification card as well as a means for physical (to buildings) and logical 




Infrastructure (PKI) technologies and will eventually replace username and password as 
the means to access computer systems.  Some form of this could be used to control access 
to an information sharing network. 
(1)  Smart Card.  The DoD CAC card is a form of smart card 
which contains information within a gold token embedded on the card and a magnetic 
stripe on the back of the card.  A biometric (left and right index fingerprint) is collected at 
the time the cards are issued, but the biometric is not stored within the card.  Currently, 
the biometric is only used when a card needs to be reissued to verify the identity of the 
person receiving the new card.  When a user inserts the card into a card reader at his 
computer he is prompted for a six to eight digit pin number.  Upon successfully entering 
the pin number, the user is able to access the computer network.  The requirement to both 
have the smart card and know the pin number provides good access control. 
(2)  PKI.  The gold chip embedded in the card contains a digital 
certificate which establishes the card user’s identity and contains PKI encryption and 
authentication keys.  DoD uses the PKI to enable CAC card holders to digitally sign e-
mail and access encrypted web sites.  The most common use of the PKI is the emergent 
Defense Travel System (DTS). 
DTS, now in use at select military installations is the latest means 
for military members to create travel orders, make travel arrangements and file travel 
vouchers.  PKI encryption allows the user to securely exchange personal information 
(including government credit card and personal bank account numbers) with the DTS 
site.  The digital signatures included with PKI also provide non-repudiation.  Once a 
member makes a reservation or signs a travel voucher, he cannot deny doing so. 
Within DTS there are different levels of users.  A “traveler” only 
has access to his own information.  An “approval authority” can see all of the “travelers” 
she is responsible for within the organization.  This person usually has responsibility for 
the travel budget and needs to be able to see certain information and take certain actions 
that a “traveler” does not.  Further, the “CTO” or travel agent who is responsible for the 
actual booking of flights and rental cars needs to be able to see a different set of data and 
use different functions.  The accessible data and available functions are all controlled by 
the person’s identity which is authenticated through the “gold chip.” 
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(3)  Disadvantages of Applying to an Information Sharing 
Network.  One of the major disadvantages of using a technology similar to CAC to 
control access would be the logistics of issuing a card to every user.  DoD currently 
issues approximately 10,000 cards per day at approximately 1300 sites.  At the present 
time, more than five million cards have been issued.  These are impressive numbers, but 
it has taken years to reach these levels.  The CAC card distribution was made simpler for 
DoD by virtue of the fact that they leveraged existing personnel databases such as the 
Defense Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System (DEERS) and the Real-Time 
Automated Personnel Identification System (RAPIDS).  Though all of the necessary 
personnel information existed in the databases, the databases needed to be redesigned to 
allow the CAC cards to be issued through the RAPIDS software.  The database redesign 
included PKI certificate management, Java Card applications and SSL client/server 
software.  Additionally, hardware such as smart card encoders and readers, card printers, 
fingerprint pads, and personal identification number pads were introduced to be able to 
produce and issue the cards.81 
Proliferating this technology to non-DoD federal workers plus state 
and local agencies (any person or agency with a need to share terrorism information) may 
prove challenging if they do not have existing personnel databases that can readily be 
modified to issue the cards.  Additionally, it may not be cost effective to supply every 
agency with the equipment and training necessary to accommodate decentralized 
distribution of the cards. 
(4)  Security Benefits of Applying to an Information Sharing 
Network.  Despite challenges which may arise in distributing the cards, a CAC card or 
equivalent technology could work well for controlling access to the information sharing 
network.  Without a card and pin number (and potentially biometric identifier) a person 
attempting to access the network would not be able to. 
In addition to controlling access at the system level, the card would 
satisfy the need to be able to establish the person’s identity and organization for the 
purposes of controlling what information and functionality is available to that specific 
                                                 
81  Global Platform, DoD Case Study, “Common Access Cards—Expanding the Functionality of ID 
Cards for the US Department of Defense,” http://www.globalplatform.org/fcs/DOD_Case_Study.pdf 
(accessed July 10, 2005). 
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user.  This function would enable meeting IRTPA’s requirement to control access to data, 
not just systems and allow information to be displayed for DoD users in accordance with 
EO 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R.  The users card could also indicate his level of security 
clearance, making it possible for the system to control access across multiple security 
levels. 
An additional advantage of each user of the network using PKI is 
that e-mail or chat traffic between counterterrorism analysts at separate agencies could be 
encrypted and digitally signed giving a level of confidence that the person on the other 
end in fact is who he claims to be and works for the agency he claims to work for.  In 
essence, any information sharing network must first have the trust of its users.  Use of 
smart cards and PKI could provide this trust, enabling the establishment of an intelligence 
“cyber community,” extending access to anyone with a card including state, local and 
tribal agencies and formatting the information for the particular user in accordance with 
guiding policy and directives.  
(5)  Privacy Benefits of Applying to an Information Sharing 
Network.  The requirement for data security is one of the fair information practices.  
Privacy expert, and law professor Daniel Solove articulates this principle well.  “Any 
organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable 
personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take 
reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of the data.”82  The principle of security is also 
specifically mentioned in numerous statutory laws intended to guard privacy.  Some 
examples include the Privacy Act, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act which deals with the privacy of financial transaction, the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, and the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act which is intended to prevent computer hacking. 
Data security is also one of the OECD guidelines.  Security of data 
is important to privacy because of the risk to unauthorized disclosure either within the 
government to an individual or agency who may use the information for an unauthorized 
purpose or to someone outside the government, for example an identity thief or hacker. 
                                                 
82  Solove, “A Taxonomy of Privacy,” 28. 
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Smart card and PKI technology are accepted as a means to protect 
computer networks, and would likely be an acceptable means to fulfill the data security 
principles.  Additionally, smart card and PKI technologies would serve as enabling 
technologies to building audit trails and oversight mechanisms, providing accountability 
for how information is used and, by extension, ensuring it is used for the purpose 
specified  Together, smart card and PKI technologies have the potential to meet or enable 
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Figure 12.   Attributes that could be met or enabled by PKI and Smart Card technologies as a 
means for authentication and access control 
 
b. Semantic Web Technologies 
While the semantic web as a whole is not a reality today, many of its 
foundational technologies do exist and could be used to exchange information in a way 
that serves security, privacy and civil liberties.  Tim Berners-Lee describes the Semantic 
Web as “an extension of the current web in which information is given well-defined 
meaning, better enabling computers and people to work in cooperation.”83 
The power of semantic web to an information sharing network is best 
described by the World Wide Web Consortium’s (W3C) web site:  “The Semantic Web 
                                                 
83  Tim Berners-Lee, James Handler, Ora Lassila, “The Semantic Web,” Scientific American, May 17, 
2001. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?articleID=00048144-10D2-1C70-
84A9809EC588EF21&catID=2 (accessed July 2, 2005). 
61 
provides a common framework that allows data to be shared and reused across 
application, enterprise, and community boundaries.”84  Given that an information sharing 
system would link numerous agencies running different software applications on different 
networks, the power to share and reuse data across applications, enterprise and 
community boundaries is exactly what is needed. 
The goal of Semantic Web is to have data defined and linked on the web 
in a way that it can be automated, integrated and reused on many applications—not just 
displayed.  The net effect of these technologies operating across a terrorism early warning 
system would be reducing the amount of time analysts spend searching for information 
related to the particular intelligence problem they are trying to solve, offering an 
improved analysis capability.  Much of the searching would be turned over to the 
computer or intelligent agents working on the analysts behalf.  “The Semantic Web will 
bring structure to the meaningful content of web pages, creating an environment where 
software agents roaming from page to page can readily carry out sophisticated tasks for 
users.”85  An effect of this is that human analysts would spend less time combing and 
sifting through irrelevant information thereby lowering the probability of that analyst’s 
exposure to information forbidden by law or policy. 
(1)  eXtensible Markup Language (XML). XML provides the 
syntax, or rules, for how data should be labeled.  The basic function of the XML 
language is to provide tags to data that describe what the data mean.  For example a 
number might have a tag which tells whether the number is a zip code, phone number, 
date or price.86  XML standardizes the way data is described, making it possible for 
multiple parties (or multiple software programs) to understand what the data is.  XML 
data tags can then be used by scripts or programs in sophisticated ways. 
(2)  Resource Data Framework (RDF).  RDF goes beyond 
describing what data mean and describe the relationships between the data.  RDF 
revolves around the idea that things being described have properties which, in turn have 
                                                 
84  Frank Manola and Eric Miller, “RDF Primer 2004,” http://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-primer/  (accessed 
June 26, 2005).  
85  Berners-Lee, “The Semantic Web.”  
86  Kenneth C. Laudon and Jane P. Laudon, Essentials of Management Information Systems (Upper 
Saddle River, NJ:  Prentice Hall Publishers, 2005), 212. 
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values.  Resources can then be described by making statements identifying the properties 




This statement has a subject (This thesis), a predicate (author) and 
an object (Kneil Novak).  The subject is the thing the statement is about, the predicate is 
the property or characteristic the statement is about and the object specifies the value of 
that property or characteristic. 
Of course a computer could not read and understand the english 
statement above.  In order to make statements machine-readable, RDF uses Uniform 
Resource Identifiers (URIs) to specifically identify a subject, predicate or object.  This is 
particularly useful because it enables machines to distinguish between things that have 
the same name.  For example, if a person named Muhammad Atta were on a terrorism 
watch list he might have a specific URI assigned to him.  The “bad” Muhammad Atta 
could be distinguished from other Muhammad Attas who would have different URIs 
assigned to them.  One can see how this would enable better data search mechanisms 
using technology such as intelligent agents. 
An analyst working on Muhammad Atta would be able to have an 
intelligent agent roaming other agencies databases for information on the Muhammad 
Atta of interest and not waste time combing through mounds of information concerning 
every Muhammad Atta in the world. 
One can also see how RDF could potentially protect innocent 
people from being confused with terror suspects or prevent any inclination to round up all 
the Muhammad Attas “just in case.” 
(3)  Web Ontology Language (OWL). In order to have effective 
information sharing, searches that cross multiple, decentralized databases must be able to 
recognize when two different databases identify the same concept in a slightly different 
way.  Stated another way, computers must be able to recognize similar concepts across 
multiple databases.  Ontologies are the way to accomplish this. 
This thesis has an author whose name (value) is Kneil Novak 
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Internet and artificial intelligence researchers and developers use 
the term ontology to describe a document or file that formally defines relationships 
among terms.87  Two important concepts related to ontologies are taxonomies and 
inference rules. 
Taxonomies provide a way to describe classes of objects and 
subclasses within them.  A simple example is the taxonomy most people learned in high 
school biology.  Humans, or the species homo-sapiens, are part of the larger class of 
mammals. 
Inference rules describe associations.  For example, we also know 
from high school biology that animals that have hair and nurse their young are mammals.  
Since humans have hair and nurse their young, they must be mammals. 
Ontologies have the potential to enable information sharing in 
multiple ways.  First, they have the ability to enable more accurate search mechanisms by 
searching for precise information and eliminating ambiguity.  For example analysts could 
search for the Muhammad Atta who holds a German passport, enrolled at a flight school 
somewhere in Florida versus performing a general search on the name Muhammad Atta.  
These searches need not be constrained to single web pages or single databases rather 
they can cross multiple databases.  For example the search might touch an Immigration 
and Customs database when searching for the passport information, a Federal Aviation 
Administration database when looking for flight school records and a Florida Department 
of Motor Vehicles database to establish the presence in Florida. 
The capability to search across databases adds a level of 
complexity since databases may not refer to data fields in exactly the same way.  For 
example one database might use slightly different terminology in referring to the same 
concept.  In order for machines to “talk” more effectively, there needs to be a common 
standard.  OWL provides this standard. 
OWL is a specific language, recommended by W3C used to 
describe ontologies.  Since W3C recommendations generally have the weight of 
international policies or standards when it comes to web development, it is likely that 
OWL will become as widespread as html or XML in the future. 
                                                 
87  Berners-Lee, “The Semantic Web.” 
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(4)  Disadvantages of Using Semantic Web technologies. The 
primary disadvantage of using semantic web technologies is that they are still relatively 
new. Although the use of XML is quickly growing on the internet, most legacy 
government databases are not likely tagged with XML.  This means that there would 
need to be a significant amount of effort to attach the XML tags or build the meta data to 
make information sharing and privacy protection a reality. 
Another difficulty is found in the ability to market the 
effectiveness of these technologies as a means to protect t privacy.  These technologies 
are relatively complex and sometimes difficult for people without a technical background 
to understand. 
If information sharing is ever going to happen, the public is going 
to have to be reassured that the privacy and civil liberty protection built into the 
architecture is for real and not just a farce.  Explaining semantic web technologies before 
they are widely proliferated could be a challenge.  People might not be willing to trust a 
system based on technology they do not understand.  As a result, government may not be 
able to rally the support they need to make such a system successful. 
(5)  Security Advantages of Using Semantic Web Technologies. 
A key advantage to using these technologies is the ability to cross application, enterprise 
and community boundaries.  This is important because it does not rely on one proprietary 
system or method to search for and/or display information.  The DoD, FBI, CIA, and 
state and local agencies can keep their own databases and use displays that their people 
are trained on and familiar with—they just need to be able to “pull in” and “push out” the 
appropriate data.  These tools have the potential to open the door for meaningful analysis 
to be conducted by machines.  This will transform the way agencies work together to gain 
knowledge and solve difficult problems.  Finally, semantic web technologies, in 
conjunction with smart cards and PKI will make it possible for information to be put into 
the right hands at the right time, in the right format and for legitimate purposes. 
(6)  Privacy Advantages of Using Semantic Web Technologies. 
An advantage of using Semantic Web technologies to privacy is that much of the 
searching and sifting of information will be automated and carried out by intelligent 
agents rather than humans putting eyes on private information.  This alone should 
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alleviate some concerns that the government is collecting and storing information 
regarding groups and activities that are protected under the constitution. 
Semantic Web technologies enable searches to be conducted across 
decentralized databases alleviating the need for a centralized government database.  This 
decentralization not only increases the analytical power necessary to identify indications 
and warnings of terrorism, it effectively “federates” the power of the government. 
The use of semantic web technologies can significantly improve 
data quality using XML.  XML tags attach meta data (data about data), lending more 
specificity to the information.  URIs could help drastically improve watchlists by 
enabling the capability to tell the difference between the Ted Kennedy who is a terrorist 
and the one who is a Senator. 
A great benefit to the use of semantic web technologies is the 
ability to customize the display of information for various users.  Used in conjunction 
with smart card and PKI technologies (identifying the user and his agency) semantic web 
technologies can enable the display of select fields of data from a database.  This has the 
potential to enable foreign intelligence analysts to access domestic databases, but view it 
in a way that is devoid of personal information (i.e. analyze transactions or behavior 
without knowing who the person is carrying out the transaction or behavior). 
Finally, semantic web technologies are another key enabler to 
generating detailed audit logs.  These audit logs, in the hands of a responsible oversight 
body, give credibility to the capability to enforce privacy standards and provide 
accountability. 
In summary, semantic web technologies could likely meet or 






















Improve analysis capability Establish capable and agile intelligence architecture
Share terrorism information 
among federal, state, local, 
tribal governments and private 
sector
Remove the "wall" between 
law enforcement and foreign 
intelligence
Share information among 
federal, state and local 
agencies
Notice/Awareness Data Quality
Access information wherever it 
resides Enable data fusion
Connect existing information 
systems
Enable those outside the 
intelligence community to 
access information
Make information available to 
NCTC Choice/Consent Purpose Specification
Improve HUMINT Analyze aberrant patterns or activity
Ensure direct and continuous 
online electronic access to 
information
Incorporate open source 
intelligence
Make data available for 
integration, analysis and 
dissemination
Access/Participation Use Limitation
Collect and analyze "new 
observables" Improve analysis capability
Facilitate analysis of 
information
Connect all intelligence 
community components as 
well as state, local, tribal 
governments and the private 
sector
Establish common security 
and access standards Security/Data Integrity Collection Limitation
Map indications and warning 
of terrorist attack to critical 
infrastructure vulnerabilities
Extract/display sensor data in 
a format in accordance with 
EO 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R
Build upon existing 
government information 
systems
Ensure the intelligence 
community and its customers 
can access information when 
they need it
Establish standards that 
facilitate automated sharing of 
information
Enforcement Security Safeguards
Identify transactions which 
precede attack
Share situational awareness 
with federal, state, local and 
tribal governments and private 
sector
Control access to data, not just 
systems
Create an intelligence "cyber 
community" Protect sources and methods Openness
Link law enforcement and 
foreign intelligence
Facilitate information sharing 
across multiple levels of 
security
Produce multiple versions 
(security classifications) of 
information
Individual Participation
Facilitate oversight through 
use of audit trails, user 
authentication and access 
controls
Accountability














Figure 13.   Attributes that could be met or enabled by the use of semantic web technologies 
 
c. Anonymization and Pseudonymization 
Anonymization refers to the capability to strip personal identifiers from 
other important information.  The medical field seems to be leading the way in the 
development of anonymization techniques. 
Doctors and medical researchers have a need to be able to share 
information to prevent and find cures to disease.  Epidemiologists and public health 
professionals need ways to detect the outbreak of a communicable disease and curb its 
spread.  To respect the privacy of their patients, the medical community is working on 
ways to share this information without identifying individual patients.  To achieve the 
ends they seek, the patient’s identity is not needed or even desirable to conduct research 
and respond to disease. 
One medical study showed that a technique known as cell suppression was 
successful at removing personal data, yet allowed the information to be useful in 
predictive analysis.88 
Another anonymization method used in the medical field is a technique 
known as one way hashing.  One way hashing exchanges actual data for a cryptic code.  
                                                 
88  Lucila Ohno-Machado, M.D., Ph.D; Staal Vinterbo, Ph.D; Stephan Dreiseitl, Ph.D; “Effects of 
Data Anonymization by Cell Suppression on Descriptive Statistics and Predictive Modeling Performance,” 
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, November/December 2002 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=419433&blobtype=pdf (accessed June 29, 2005). 
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In our context one way hashing could be applied to names on a no-fly list to generate a 
list of codes.  The same hashing technique could then be applied to airline manifest. This 
would result in the cryptic codes being compared rather than actual names.  If the two 
codes matched, the actual name could be released to an appropriate authority.  Without a 
match no personally identifying information would be viewed.89 
Another anonymization technique is known as k-anonymity.  k-anonymity 
provides a means to release a dataset in which the included information is incapable of 
being traced or matched to a specific individual about whom the data concerns.  This 
provides de-identified data, but maintains the utility of the data.90  In our context k-
anonymity would allow domestic intelligence analysts the ability to push de-identified 
information to foreign intelligence analysts without having to reveal personal 
information.  This could be particularly powerful in linking domestic transactions or 
behavior to known terrorists overseas.  The benefit is that in the event no terrorism nexus 
were revealed, foreign intelligence analysts would not have been exposed to USPERSON 
data. 
Pseudonymization refers to representing personally identifying 
information by pseudonym.  A simple example of pseudomymization is the use of screen 
names in chat rooms, blog sites, at online auction sites such as E-Bay, or when writing a 
book review at Amazon.com.  The use of pseudonyms is a commonplace practice in 
trying to preserve privacy on the internet. 
Anonymization and pseudonymization techniques are gaining acceptance 
as a means to protect privacy.  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) Privacy Rule sets forth rules governing the sharing of healthcare information.  
The summary of the Privacy Rule spans twenty-five pages.  However, the rule 
specifically states, “there are no restrictions on the use or disclosure of de-identified 
health information.”  This speaks volumes to the privacy protection that the healthcare 
community believes anonymization techniques provide. 
                                                 
89  James X. Dempsey and Paul Rosenzweig, Heritage Foundation, “Technologies That Can Protect 
Privacy as Information is Shared to Combat Terrorism,” May 2004, 1-2   
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/lm11.cfm (accessed February 22, 2006). 
90  Latanya Sweeney, “k-anonymity: A Model for Protecting Privacy,” International Journal on 
Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems 10 (5) 2002: 557-570. 
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(1) Security Advantages of Using Anonymization/ 
Pseudonymization.  Many of the analysis functions required to improve security can be 
accomplished with using anonymized data including pattern matching and data mining.91  
This may enable state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies to share information 
with the intelligence community in unprecedented ways enabling greater analysis of 
“new observables” and the ability to link overseas and domestic transactions that may be 
precursors to a terrorist strike. 
The removal of personally identifying information in general meets 
the need to share information with the DoD community in a way that is consistent with 
EO 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R while enabling DoD analysts access to transactional data.  
This would allow DoD analysts to participate in the search for aberrant patterns without 
having the capability to know who is participating in the activity.  This fact essentially 
makes the “wall” between domestic and foreign intelligence analysts largely irrelevant.  
Finally, the use of anonymized data would allow information to be integrated, analyzed 
and disseminated much more widely. 
(2) Privacy Advantages of Using Anonymization/ 
Pseudonymization.  The removal of personal information from data sets or the release of 
data sets that make it impossible to re-identify the person the data regards offers a great 
benefit in the protection of privacy.  Since the privacy principles are intended to govern 
the use of personal information, the use of anonymous data may offer a “work around” to 
adhering to privacy principles.  This has the potential to make the principles of 
notice/awareness and choice/consent irrelevant. More research is needed to support this 
assertion.  
In summary, anonymization and pseudonymization techniques 
may be able to support, enable or provide a work around to the attributes highlighted in 
Figure 14. 
 
                                                 
91  K.A. Taipale, “Technology, Security and Privacy:  The Fear of Frankenstein, the Mythology of 
Privacy and the Lessons of King Ludd,”  Yale Journal of Law and Technology 7, no. 123 (December 2004),  
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Figure 14.   Attributes that could be met, enabled or deemed irrelevant by using 
anonymization/ pseudonymization technologies 
 
While not all attributes in the matrix are addressed by the 
technologies discussed in this chapter, it should be apparent that the use of technology 
has the potential to meet attributes on both the security and privacy sides of the matrix.  
Hopefully, it is also apparent that privacy and security need not be considered rivals 
within the context of a terrorism early warning system.  Additional research and 
technological advancements are likely to yield even more opportunities to expand both 
security and privacy improving analysts’ and operators’ ability to keep the nation safe 
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V. POLICY AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATIONS 
While technological innovations have the potential to radically change the 
calculus of the relationship between security and privacy, the entirety of the problem 
cannot be solved by technology alone.  Policy and technology must be married in a 
symbiotic relationship with the overarching goal of establishing a terrorism early warning 
system that values security and privacy.  In this relationship, one should give energy to 
the other.  For example, a particular technological innovation may enable a policy to be 
more enforceable or the advent of a particularly innovative policy option may spawn 
research into the technology to make the policy more feasible.  The point is that policy 
and technology should always be considered jointly, not irrespective of each other.  This 
requires collaboration between technologists, privacy advocates, analysts, operators and 
policy and lawmakers.  One way to encourage this collaboration is through the 
establishment of privacy and civil liberties officers within agencies with counterterrorism 
responsibilities. 
A. INSTITUTING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTY OFFICERS 
Numerous efforts are underway that could provide a solid foundation to build an 
early warning system or ISE cognizant of privacy and civil liberty concerns.  One effort, 
signed into law in section 1061 of IRTPA, establishes the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board.  This board, appointed by the President, is to serve as the principal 
watchdog in ensuring citizens’ rights and privacy are not violated by domestic 
intelligence gathering.  Furthermore, Section 1062 of the law states, “It is the sense of 
Congress that each executive department or agency with law enforcement or 
antiterrorism functions should designate a privacy and civil liberties officer.”92 This 
“sense of Congress” is worth building upon. 
Appointing talented leaders within agencies responsible for homeland defense and 
security as Privacy and Civil Liberties Officers (PCLOs) would pave the way to establish 
a system capable of protecting privacy.  It is not enough, however, to simply appoint 
PCLOs for the sake of having them.  An effective strategy must establish what PCLOs 
should do once they are appointed.  An effective strategy must also provide a structure or 
                                                 
92  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 47-48. 
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framework in which they can operate and define their role and level of influence.  The 
goal of the strategy should be to provide opportunities for PCLOs to learn about the 
importance of civil liberties then insert them into the corporate processes which acquire, 
develop, and transition new surveillance and information sharing systems to operations.  
Furthermore, PCLOs should be given the opportunity to network with other agencies’ 
PCLOs and the Privacy and the President’s Civil Liberties Oversight Board. 
Finding the right people to be PCLOs is critically important.  PCLOs should be 
selected from talented mid-level engineers, acquirers, system operators, investigators, 
action officers, or intelligence analysts.  They should be respected as stars or rising stars 
in their fields and possess the capability to articulate complex thoughts in a pressure 
environment.  They should not be easily intimidated by rank or authority, but should have 
the utmost respect for those in positions of authority.  PCLOs should not be lawyers 
themselves, though they should strive to develop a relationship with their agency’s 
lawyers (or office of general counsel) and feel comfortable seeking their advice.  PCLOs 
should not be senior decision makers within their organization, but they should be able to 
command their attention and feel comfortable working with them. 
The person best suited to be a PCLO is not the person who would sit in the back 
of a meeting and say, “you can’t do that,” and offer no suggestion to a workable solution.  
PCLOs should be the type of people who can sit in a relatively technical meeting and say, 
“if we design the architecture or system in this way, we might be able to minimize the 
likelihood that the information could be abused.”  They should not be required to come 
up with technical solutions on their own, but they must be able to identify opportunities 
to build safeguards or accountability into the system being designed, acquired or used.  
Finally, PCLOs should be selected from willing candidates.  The duty of PCLO should be 
recognized as being significant and not dumped on some unwilling person as another 
additional duty.  In order to encourage people within an agency to take on this duty, the 
position should be rewarding and attractive.  It can be made attractive through the 





1. PCLO Training and Responsibilities 
PCLOs should receive training on a quarterly or perhaps semiannual basis.  Since 
the PCLOs would be selected from experts in their respective fields, the initial training 
sessions should focus on the role of civil liberties in the United States. 
The first topic PCLOs should be educated (or perhaps re-educated) on is our 
founding documents and the founding fathers’ views on liberty.  Studying documents 
such as the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the Federalist Papers 
would remind PCLOs of the significance liberty plays in America.  A noteworthy 
instructor could teach this at an inspiring location such as Philadelphia or Williamsburg, 
Virginia.  Studying America’s past would undoubtedly stir the PCLOs to make wise 
decisions regarding liberty in its future.  Understanding what American activities are 
legitimate and protected would enable the PCLOs to influence the design of a system that 
would not store or abuse data concerning those activities. 
Having studied the founding documents, it would then be useful to receive 
training on judicial processes and specific jurisprudence related to civil liberties, privacy, 
Posse Comitatus, implications of Executive Order 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, the USA 
PATRIOT Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).  Such a course 
could include a trip to the Supreme Court and be taught by a professor from a leading law 
school in the Washington D.C. area.  In addition, leading civil liberties or privacy 
scholars from the area could be invited to lecture.  Understanding legal frameworks 
would clarify which government agencies could legally view, store, or handle which 
types of information. 
This understanding would facilitate the design of a system that automatically 
knows what information it may stream to whom.  It may also enable data sets to be 
rapidly sent to an agency that may not normally receive them.  To use a 9/11scenario as a 
hypothetical example, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) may always receive 
information regarding the airline, pilot, location, passenger list and speed of an aircraft 




“business as usual.”  In the event that military assistance is needed, the FAA may enable 
the surveillance information, or specific pieces of it, to be viewed at NORAD to deal with 
an imminent threat. 
After the PCLOs are established and trained on these topics, consideration should 
be given to conducting a course on systems engineering.  In this course, PCLOs could 
explore how to design architectures with privacy and civil liberties as a key design factor.  
A list of these design factors could be adapted from documents mentioned in this thesis 
and from the Markle Foundation Task Force’s report “Protecting America’s Freedom in 
the Information Age,” specifically illustration number three:  guidelines for database 
access and use.93 
Consideration should be given to awarding PCLOs with a degree or certificate for 
accomplishing this training.  Such formal recognition for the training would be a 
motivator for the PCLOs to complete it and would appropriately recognize the people 
with this specific knowledge. 
The content of all of this training would be extremely important, but the 
relationships formed by going through the training with counterparts from different 
agencies around the country would be just as significant.  The relationships formed 
during these sessions would lead to the establishment of a PCLO network. 
2. Networked Leaders Creating an Information Sharing Network 
The network established as a result of social bonds and common training would 
strengthen the resolve of individual PCLOs to continue to pursue the advancement of 
both liberty and security in their individual organizations.  The collaboration and 
information sharing between PCLOs would likely spread beyond themselves and result in 
greater collaboration and information sharing between the agencies as a whole.  For 
example, as PCLOs from several agencies interact they may find that each agency is 
engaged in developing their own surveillance system with strikingly similar requirements 
and capabilities.  This discovery may prompt the agencies to develop one shared system  
 
 
                                                 
93  Baird and Barksdale, “Protecting America’s Freedom,” 32-34. 
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rather than many stovepiped systems.  This avoidance of a duplication of effort could 
result in savings to the taxpayer, not to mention the obvious advantage of shared 
information. 
The connection of PCLOs to each other is vitally important, but they should also 
be connected to the “Privacy and Civil Liberties Board” established by the President. 
This connection would foster a cohesive national effort to pursue the advancement of 
both liberty and security and give more clout to agency PCLOs.  The senior decision 
makers in each agency may be more apt to give credence to their PCLO’s 
recommendations if they know he has direct access to this board (and the board direct 
access to the President).  As PCLOs generate numerous ideas at their agencies, the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Board could identify best practices and recommend changes 
to the President.  Working in reverse, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board could provide 
guidance to the agency PCLOs while allowing them autonomy within their agencies. 
PCLOs would benefit from having access to a set of collaborative tools to keep in 
touch and share ideas with each other.  Information technology tools such as on-line 
forums and secure chat rooms would make this possible.  It is likely that many of the 
organizations with PCLOs would already have the necessary information technology 
infrastructure to make this relatively simple and cheap to provide. 
A network of people from every agency would play a great role in developing a 
terrorism early warning network that could potentially connect every agency.  The 
network of sensors and computers would enable the right information to be put into the 
right hands at the right time.  The network of people would ensure the information is not 
used by the wrong agency, for the wrong purpose, anytime. They can ensure this by 
designing the system with that end in mind.  Furthermore, this networking could enable 
an unprecedented level of oversight. 
B. INSTITUTING “ACTIVE, LAYERED OVERSIGHT” 
Oversight is paramount to the development of a terrorism early warning system 
dedicated to preserving liberty.  The system must enable the capability to “watch the 
watchers” to ensure no one agency or branch of government assumes an inordinate 
amount of power.  The framers of the Constitution were gravely concerned about 
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establishing proper checks and balances within government and spreading power 
amongst the three branches of the federal government and the states. 
The concept of “active, layered oversight” attempts to build checks and balances 
into the oversight of the system.  At the same time, it attempts to recognize and deal with 
abuses at the lowest possible level with the capability to deal with them at higher levels if 
necessary.  Active, layered oversight relies on each agency overseeing its own use of 
information (intra-agency), a mechanism for interagency oversight (one agency 
overseeing another), executive branch oversight and Congressional oversight.  Each layer 
of oversight would be empowered by audit trails and logs showing how information was 
used by a particular agency.  The hope is that very view issues would need to be solved at 
the executive branch or Congressional levels. 
 
 
Figure 15.   An Active, Layered Oversight Model 
 
1. Internal (Intra-Agency) Oversight 
The first layer of oversight requires each agency with access to the terrorism early 
warning system to develop the capability and mechanisms to monitor its own use of 
information.  Most organizations with counterterrorism responsibilities already possess 
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an inspector general or internal affairs office.  This office could be responsible for 
reviewing audit trails and information use logs to ensure its analysts and operators are 
appropriately using the data they have access to.  Additionally, each agency should 
develop training programs to train its operators and analysts on what uses are considered 
proper.  The space operations career field has a process in place whereby commands sent 
to satellites can be “played back” and operators held accountable or given additional 
training for mistakes.94  A similar method could be adopted in a system that is capable of 
auditing how information is used.  Internal oversight would likely curb a large percentage 
of potential abuse or misuse of information. 
2. Interagency Peer-to-Peer Oversight 
Most elementary school children who have taken spelling tests understand that 
integrity increases manifold simply by exchanging papers when the time comes for 
grading.  Interagency, peer-to-peer oversight is based on the concept of accountability 
and could leverage existing technology to exchange audit logs with peers in other 
agencies.  These “peers” could be randomized to prevent any collusion between agents at 
different agencies to abuse information. 
A similar concept already exists on the internet for friends or “accountability 
partners” to share internet activity reports in an effort to avoid pornography on the web.  
One company, Covenant Eyes, has developed a scoring algorithm which rates the 
“offensiveness” of internet material and automatically generates and e-mails a report to 
one’s accountability partner in the event it suspects the person is viewing pornographic 
material.95  The algorithm is not perfect.  Sometimes false reports are generated, but these 
false positives can normally be resolved through discussion. 
The Covenant Eyes model could be adapted for use in a terrorism early warning 
system.  Building on access and semantic web technologies discussed earlier, an 
algorithm could be developed to score audit logs and warn of potential misuse of personal 
information.  For example, logs might be traded between NSA and CIA agents and  
 
                                                 
94  Author’s experience as a satellite operator and evaluator.  
95  See www.covenanteyes.com for more information on how the scoring algorithms and the system in 
general operate. 
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indications of abuse may simply warrant a phone call to ask, “What are you doing?”  The 
ensuing conversation may clear up confusion or it may prevent a disingenuous use of 
personal information. 
In the event one peer became belligerent or insists in engaging in suspect 
behavior, the other peer could then forward a complaint to the next layer of oversight. 
3. Executive Branch Oversight 
Hopefully, very few instances of abuse would reach this layer of oversight.  Its 
existence, however, is necessary to provide a forum to consolidate reports of abuse from 
lower levels and to arbitrate any disputes over allegations of abuse between agencies.  
The most likely candidates to take on this function would be the DNI’s Privacy Office 
and/or the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board—both established by IRTPA.  These offices 
might oversee the development and deployment of a Covenant Eyes-like technology and 
conduct periodic inspections of its own to ensure compliance with policy and law. 
Additionally, this layer of oversight could establish a web form or hotline as a 
collection point for complaints of information abuse.  This would provide whistleblowers 
an outlet (other than the media) to resolve their concerns.  In the event a whistleblower 
felt uncomfortable lodging a complaint within the executive branch, he could take it to 
the next level—Congressional oversight. 
4. Congressional Oversight 
Given that Congress has the power to pass laws and controls the nations “purse,” 
the final layer of oversight needs to be conducted by Congress, more specifically by a 
select congressional committee or subcommittee.  The 9/11 Commission Report offers 
some practical suggestions on how Congress could engage in its oversight function. 
The 9/11 Commission recommended Congress pursue establishing a Joint 
Committee for intelligence oversight based on the model of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy or a committee in each house of Congress combining authorizing and 
appropriating authorities.  Either framework would likely work.  What is essential is that 
Congress recognize its role in developing the laws and policies that guide the 
development and use of a terrorism early warning system and that they demand its 
development tend to the values of privacy and security—not attempt to achieve a balance. 
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Where existing policy is irrelevant either by the current national security 
environment or the advent of new technology, Congress needs to lead by formulating 
policies that provide for the nation’s protection from external and internal threats. 
Finally, whatever structure Congress chooses in organizing itself to conduct 
oversight, they must maintain a close relationship with the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Board and the Privacy Officers within the DNI and DHS.  This is essential as these 
executive offices have the capability to reach into the next layer of oversight. 
Technology has a significant role to play in enabling the concept of “active, 
layered oversight,” but leadership has an even more significant role.  Without 
Congressional leadership, oversight mechanisms are likely to remain status quo, relying 
on policy developed during the Cold War to guide us in a much more complex 
environment.  Leadership is essential, and if Congress fails to lead the executive will 
likely attempt to fill the void.  This will likely threaten the balance of power that is 
crucial to our form of government. 
C. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The following bullet points are offered as a summary to the main points 
developed in the thesis. 
• There is a mandate to vastly improve the ability to share terrorism 
information as a means to respond to terrorism.  Since terrorism does not 
respect borders, this mandate includes improved sharing of domestic 
intelligence and the “growing together” of foreign and domestic 
intelligence 
• In the sharing of this information, as all of the government documents 
relevant to this subject affirm, the privacy and civil liberties of Americans 
must be protected 
• Responding to terrorism while protecting privacy and civil liberties is 
often articulated as “finding the right balance.”  This model is dangerous, 
as it implies security and privacy are values that must compete or be 
traded in a zero-sum game 
• A better model represents these values as mutually reinforcing and equally 
beneficial to the continued success of American society in the age of 
terrorism 
• Armed with this mindset, it is possible to identify privacy and security 
principles that could be used as requirements in the design and 
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development of a terrorism early warning system.  The requirements can 
be represented in a Security and Privacy Reference Matrix 
• Current and near-term technologies show great promise in being able to 
address requirements on both the privacy and security sides of the matrix.  
Additional research and development is needed to further  
• Strong cooperation among stakeholder agencies and privacy advocates is 
needed to develop a system which vigorously considers the principles 
articulated on both sides of the matrix.  This cooperation could be 
facilitated by instituting PCLOs within stakeholder agencies, enabling the 
formation of a network of PCLOs across the country. 
• Strong leadership from all branches of government is necessary to ensure 
the terrorism early warning system or ISE is designed and built with these 
principles in mind and to establish the laws, policy and oversight 
mechanisms that will govern its use. 
Transnational terrorists, particularly terrorists determined to obtain and use 
weapons of mass destruction, pose a significant national security threat.  Responding to 
this threat requires the development of an early warning system with the capability to 
warn of indications of attack wherever on the globe they may surface, including within 
our own borders. 
The capability to look for indications of terrorism within our own borders carries 
weighty implications. The development of an effective terrorism early warning system 
must not threaten the privacy and civil liberties of Americans, otherwise we run the risk 
of the nation crumbling from the inside out.  This risk is just as real as that posed by an 
external attack. 
Achieving the proper relationship between liberty and security is not unique to the 
twenty-first century or to the struggle in dealing with terrorism.  The Founding Fathers 
struggled with this concept at length.  In Federalist Paper Eight Alexander Hamilton 
expressed concern over an America focused on security at the expense of freedom. 
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national 
conduct.  Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its 
dictates.  The violent destruction of life and property incident to war—the 
continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will 





security to institutions, which have a tendency to destroy their civil and 
political rights.  To be more safe they, at length, become willing to run the 
risk of being less free.96 
In what is likely to be a long war against terrorism, America must guard against 
the tendency to be less free.  Security and liberty are not values to be traded, they are 
values that must be defended.  In the case of liberty, it should not be defended solely by 
privacy advocates, but also by those who have taken oaths to “support and defend the 
Constitution” and by the people at large. 
It is possible to build an effective terrorism early warning system that protects 
against unnecessary intrusions on privacy.  Building such a system will take the 
cooperation of technology, policies, laws and effective oversight mechanisms.  More 
importantly it will take the collective national will to research, design and build the 
system—not a fight between two camps continually trying to add weight to one side of a 
security-privacy scale. 
The days of Revere, Franklin, Hamilton were uncertain.  The future of America 
was, at times, in doubt.  The courage, leadership and ingenuity of such men, however, set 
a course that has served the country well.  Similar courage, leadership and ingenuity are 
needed today so that we can hear the warning bells predicting attack and at the same time 
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